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Introduction
The goal of this paper is to place the current structure of Dutch owner-
ship and control in a historical perspective. The historical development of
Dutch ﬁnancial markets and institutions is somewhat idiosyncratic. It
mixes elements such as a stock exchange culture dating back to the Dutch
golden age of seaborne trading dominance, a legal system handed down
from a brief period of French occupation, and strong inﬂuences from
neighboring Germany as well as England and the United States. The paper
ﬁrst sets out, in section 8.1, to describe in brief the historical development
of Dutch industrial ﬁnance. The remainder of the paper then turns to a
comparative analysis of Dutch listed ﬁrms over the course of the twentieth
century by focusing on three years spaced at thirty-ﬁve-year intervals:
1923, 1958, and 1993. A general description of the data and their sources
is given in section 8.2, focusing on a wide array of ﬁnancial characteristics
of the ﬁrms. This is followed in section 8.3 by a closer analysis of corporate
control mechanisms and, in particular, shareholder rights and defenses
against hostile takeovers. Networks of inﬂuence are the focus of section
8.4, and the main themes discussed in that section are the nature and com-
position of the supervisory and management boards: the degree to which
there are interlocking directorships with banks and other industrial ﬁrms,
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The Dutch have some claim to a pioneering role in stock exchange capi-
talism. The ﬁrst shareholdings in a Dutch corporation came into being in
1602, when the Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC), the ﬁrst great
limited-liability joint stock company in the world, was founded. The initial
investors were, in 1602, unaware of their destiny: ostensibly, they were con-
tributing money to a limited-term partnership that would send out a series
of merchant ships to the East Indies, with a liquidating dividend promised
at the end of twenty years. To the investors’ dismay (and despite their vo-
ciferous protests), in 1622 the company’s directors (who reported to the
government rather than to the shareholders) decided to prolong the com-
pany’s charter, thus shelving the liquidation and keeping this astonishingly
lucrative1 enterprise going for many years.
By the middle of the seventeenth century the Netherlands had developed
an active shareholding culture, with speculation in VOC shares and even
derivatives trading a widespread popular pursuit. In the eighteenth cen-
tury, the fortunes of the Dutch East India trade declined, and the VOC ﬁ-
nally went under in 1799. Even so, the wealth amassed by the Dutch dur-
ing the Golden Age was still largely undissipated and primarily invested in
a wide range of international government securities. A spate of defaults,
notably by the French government, reduced this wealth and seriously under-
mined conﬁdence in securities investment, but even in the nineteenth cen-
tury there were still many wealthy rentier families whose riches were pri-
marily held in the form of securities.2
In the early nineteenth century the Dutch nation emerged from the
French occupation of 1795–1813; it assumed its present geographical con-
tours with the separation of Belgium from the Netherlands in 1830. The
ﬁrst half of the nineteenth century was a period of continued economic
stagnation: Dutch investment in infrastructure and the new steam-driven
manufacturing technologies was minimal, and the country’s industrial de-
velopment lagged far, far behind that of Belgium, Germany, France, and,
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1. By the time of its last dividend in 1782, an initial investment of f 100 in the VOC would
have yielded f 360,033.33 in payouts (Steensgaard 1982). Steensgaard gives an insightful dis-
cussion of how the novel corporate form of the VOC made this enduring proﬁtability pos-
sible—for example, by facilitating long-term investments in the military protection of trad-
ing routes and monopolies.
2. The rentier class were popularly referred to as coupon-cutters: “ces rentiers hollandais
que le peuple appelle ironiquement coupon-knippers, parce qu’ils n’ont rien à faire, sauf à de-
tacher les coupons semestriels de leurs fonds publics” (de Laveleye 1864, p. 329).of course, England. This period of retarded growth has been studied in-
tensively by economic historians, and the consensus now seems to be that
it cannot be attributed to a shortage of capital or to Dutch investors’ sup-
posed preference for foreign investments above domestic industry. Other
factors seem more likely culprits. One was the disarray of government ﬁ-
nances: the new Kingdom of the Netherlands inherited from the French a
crushing debt burden of 420 percent of net national income, with con-
comitantly high interest rates on government paper; the situation was not
brought under control until around 1850 (see Jonker 1996). Another was
the need to redeﬁne the traditional division of labor within the low coun-
tries: the southern provinces, now Belgium, had traditionally specialized in
manufacturing while the North focused on commerce. Thus, there was no
strong manufacturing base to build on. Then there were the steep transport
costs related to the extra cost of providing a proper infrastructure, with ad-
equate drainage and ﬂood defenses, in such low-lying and waterlogged ter-
ritory; and various other factors such as the high cost of raw materials, and
the high wage levels and the poor education of the citizenry.
Industrial development started coming to life in the second half of the
nineteenth century, with new shareholder capital raised for a number of en-
terprises such as railway construction, albeit rather laboriously, buﬀeted by
the vicissitudes of international political developments and the business
cycle. The main source of capital for industry during that period seems to
have been retained earnings, supplemented with contributions by mem-
bers of the founding families and closely connected wealthy individuals.
Interestingly, the rather meager contribution of publicly raised equity was
not oﬀset by long-term bank loan ﬁnance: such ﬁnancing was also very
scarce throughout the country’s industrialization.
The long period of stagnation of the eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries, and the short period of French hegemony, create a natural break
in capital market traditions and institutions. Only in the late nineteenth
century did substantive modern industrial development get oﬀthe ground.
Although several institutions were already present in the Dutch Golden
Age, we take this revival as a starting point for our analysis. We turn now
to a few speciﬁc themes that are of central importance for the genesis of to-
day’s landscape of corporate ﬁnance and control: ﬁrst, the evolution of the
Dutch framework of company law, and second, the role of the stock ex-
change, banks, and private ﬁnancing in providing capital for industry.
8.1.2 Evolution of the Public Limited Company
Public shareholder ﬁnance requires an appropriate legal basis, and at the
start of the seventeenth century, there was little in the way of precedent to
draw upon. The earliest Dutch joint-stock enterprises of the seventeenth
century (in addition to the VOC, several other trading companies and a
number of insurance companies emerged) were explicitly created to further
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and control exercised by public appointees. Almost from the start, Dutch
shareholding culture was embroiled in a series of corporate governance
skirmishes, as conﬂicts of interest became apparent and their resolution
was hammered out.3
The legal form of the Dutch corporation evolved over time from the
early days of the VOC.4 Around 1720, the legal status of the limited com-
pany or naamloze vennootschap(NV for short) was largely remodeled along
the precedent set by English company law; and the setting up of companies
whose primary purpose was private proﬁt, rather than the service of the
public interest, became the norm. By and large, the companies set up at the
time in Holland were reputable, unlike some of their English counterparts
spawned by the prevailing stock market bubble. One Dutch innovation of
the time was the Amsterdam broker Abraham van Ketwich’s creation, in
1774, of the world’s ﬁrst investment trust:5 the Negotiatie onder de Zin-
spreuk “Eendraagt Maakt Magt” (Investment under the Motto “Unity Is
Strength”). The subsequent collapse of company proﬁts and share prices
led to a slowdown in the creation of new limited companies (and of new in-
vestment trusts: after 1779, there was a ninety-year hiatus).
Following the French occupation of the turn of the nineteenth century,
Dutch civil law was codiﬁed along lines closely following the French civil
code of 1804. The Wetboek van Koophandel (commercial code) of 1838 set
the legal parameters for public limited companies. From the start, it was
felt to be inadequate to its purpose. At ﬁrst, there was particular resistance
to the “foreign” notion that the founding of a public limited company
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3. These disputes bear an amusing resemblance to the issues that are still being debated
today. Those initial VOC shareholders who were not actively involved in the running of the
company—known as the long-suﬀering or dolerende shareholders—had many reasons for
complaint. Their objections are vividly preserved in the company’s archives. The initial
complaints centered around payout policy (when the interim dividend payouts were passed
or fell short of the amount stipulated in the company’s charter, and when the promised liqui-
dating dividend of 1622 was shelved) and the murkiness of the company’s accounts: letters
and pamphlets calling for ﬁnancial disclosure and speaking of abuses and damaging disor-
ders were circulated, but they were ignored by the Heeren XVII—the “seventeen gentlemen”
directors—until the strength of shareholder outrage prompted the government to require full
and open accounts for 1622. Even so, a groundswell of protest about inadequate ﬁnancial dis-
closure continued for decades after. Later documents regulate the conﬂation of management’s
personal interests with those of the company proper (there were numerous company direc-
tives reminding its employees that they were under no circumstances allowed to transport or
trade goods on own account, and the Heeren XVII brought out a report in 1741 on abuses by
company management at home and abroad). There is even the seventeenth-century equiva-
lent of the corporate jet (directors’ travel on company business by inland yacht, and the dec-
laration of travel expenses, was carefully regulated—for example, in a document dating from
1698). See Frentrop (2003) for an English-language history of Dutch corporate governance.
4. Our description is based on the introductory chapter of van der Heijden’s (1992) hand-
book of Dutch company law.
5. Albeit one containing a somewhat curious lottery element, intended to stimulate specu-
lative interest.would require royal approval, even if the conditions that would ensure such
approval were set down in the law. Camﬀerman (2000) mentions that, in
particular, the relevant government ministry’s practice of asking that ﬁ-
nancial accounts be sent in on an annual basis was very unpopular. The law
also failed to address a number of issues such as the personal liability of
founders, issuers, management, and directors; the shareholders’ obliga-
tions with regard to paying in their capital,6 and nonmonetary contribu-
tions to the company. The last quarter of the nineteenth century saw a spate
of company bankruptcies, some of which involved the outright looting of
company funds. The weaknesses of corporate governance safeguards in
protecting investors, and in particular the inadequacies of monitoring by
boards of directors, was already an open matter of public concern, as evi-
denced by ﬁgure 8.1, an 1898 cartoon depicting a supervisory board in ac-
tion.
After a very long period of public debate, with legislative proposals sub-
mitted, withdrawn, and resubmitted regularly from 1871 onward, a new,
more comprehensive and ﬂexible company law was ﬁnally enacted in 1928.
Preventive government scrutiny was retained: the minister of justice would
vet the proposed charter of an NV before it could be registered with the
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6. For example, in the case of the NCS railway initial public oﬀering (IPO) in 1860, de-
scribed in the appendix 1.
Fig. 8.1 Caricature of a Dutch supervisory board, by J. Braakensiek, 1898 
(currently in the Gemeente Archief Amsterdam)
Commissioner A (to his neighbor): “Is everything in order over there, with that safe....  ? ”
Commissioner B: “Now listen here, that is up to the management. We have our hands full su-
pervising the company; if we have to start looking after the safe as well . . .”chamber of commerce and thereby oﬃcially founded. The new regime was
based on four principles (Van der Heijden 1992, para. 28, p. 19):
1. Preventive government monitoring, including the possibility of judi-
cial suppression
2. Transparency of the internal organization and division of powers (in-
cluding ﬁnancial reporting)
3. Protection of the capital against excessive payouts to shareholders
4. Strengthened liability of founders, management, and directors
One of the most controversial issues was the openness requirement, in
particular the obligation to publish full annual accounts (a balance sheet
and a proﬁt and loss statement) open to the general public. Traditionally
many companies had kept this information private within a small inner
circle—for example, by allowing only a small number of shareholder dele-
gates to look at the accounts. Almost immediately, a commission was set
up to examine if the obligation to publish accounts could be weakened. The
law was criticized for not distinguishing between large, open companies
that placed securities with the general public and closed or family compa-
nies that did not. Others countered that limited liability requires, in prin-
ciple, openness of the ﬁnancial situation of both kinds of NV. Other ob-
jections concerned the law’s restrictions on oligarchic clauses, the rights of
redress awarded to minority shareholders, and the strengthened liability of
management and directors.
Company law was again fully revised in 1970–71. The main impetus was
twofold.
Firstly, there was the need to adjust to the European Economic Com-
munity’s First Directive on Company Law of 1968. The biggest change in
this regard was to create a new, separate type of limited company, follow-
ing the law of surrounding countries (Germany, France, and Belgium): the
besloten vennootschap (BV) or closed company, in addition to the tradi-
tional NV. The impact of this change was immediate. The great majority of
smaller companies converted from NV to BV, primarily as a result of the
lower level of ﬁnancial disclosure required of the latter (NVs were now re-
quired to make their annual accounts readily available to the public at large
by depositing them at the oﬃces of the handelsregister). In addition, new
arrangements were set in motion for the protection of minority sharehold-
ers (through enquêterecht: the right to ask for a judicial enquiry under cer-
tain conditions).
The second force driving change was the wish to increase the inﬂuence
of employees. Dutch attitudes to the role of corporations had evolved over
the course of the twentieth century. In the beginning of the century, corpo-
rations were seen as vehicles for shareholder wealth creation. Over the
course of the century, ﬁrms became seen as more independent entities ori-
ented toward continuity, stability, and the interests of multiple stakehold-
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It is perhaps the relative homogeneity of the Dutch population that has fos-
tered a sense of solidarity, expressed in a preference for consensus decision-
making and a generous welfare system. The corporatist model of central-
ized, consensual economic decision-making, known as the poldermodel,
was very successful in the reconstruction of the Dutch economy after
World War II. In particular, centralized collective bargaining made pos-
sible a lengthy period of wage restraint that contributed substantially to
economic growth. In return, employee representation in decisions regard-
ing job security and employment is considered appropriate. And indeed,
any corporate restructuring that involves the loss of jobs imposes a signif-
icant cost on the public purse in the form of unemployment and/or dis-
ability pay. This means that corporate decision making has a direct public
interest dimension. Not surprisingly, the stakeholder view of corporate
governance, which sees shareholders as just one of many interested parties
entitled to a say in decision making, dominates Dutch public opinion.
The structuurregime or “structured regime,” introduced in 1971, was de-
signed to increase worker participation by imposing a carefully deﬁned
control structure on all larger ﬁrms (roughly speaking, those with at least
100 employees). Such ﬁrms must set up an ondernemingsraad(OR) or com-
pany council, a body created to represent and consult the views of em-
ployees.7 These and other large ﬁrms (those with capital and reserves of at
least f 25 million) are also obliged to set up a supervisory board (raad van
commissarissen, RvC) with some powers that might otherwise be held by
the shareholders’ meeting. Such a board appoints new members itself by
co-optation (unless the shareholders’ meeting or council objects), and the
statutes may determine that one or more are to be government appointees.
The board supervises important managerial decisions, appoints and dis-
misses the management board (raad van bestuur, RvB), and establishes and
approves the yearly accounts (De Jong et al. 2004).
A perhaps unintended side eﬀect of the structuurregime is that, because
it gives shareholders almost no say in the appointment or removal of super-
visory board members and management, it protects entrenched manage-
ment to an excessive degree. The co-optation system is currently the topic
of intense public debate and is unlikely to survive in its current form.
The most recent developments in the Netherlands are two best practices
codes for publicly listed ﬁrms. The ﬁrst code is a product of the Peters Com-
mittee, named after former Aegon chief executive oﬃcer (CEO) Jaap Pe-
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7. It has a right to relevant information, a right to advise on major decisions (e.g., transfers
of ownership, relocation, and important investments); it can delay decisions it disagrees with
for one month and appeal to the ondernemingskamer (company chamber) of the Amsterdam
Court. Its permission is required for changes to social arrangements (pensions, working
hours, wages, safety rules), and if it disagrees the employer must obtain a local judge’s deci-
sion to go ahead.ters. This code contains forty recommendations, about the role of man-
agement, supervisory boards, and, most important, a reconsideration of
the role of capital in governance. As thirty-nine (out of the forty) recom-
mendations did not involve legal changes, the code’s implementation draws
on self-regulation. De Jong et al. (2004) show that this eﬀort failed, as no
observable changes were present and stock market reactions, if present,
werenegative. After the irregularities with Ahold an initiative was taken to
restore investors’ conﬁdence in the Dutch market. In March 2003 a com-
mittee chaired by Morris Tabaksblat, former CEO of Unilever, started a
new code and had already released the ﬁnal draft in December 2003. Fol-
lowing the successful U.K. codes, the comply-or-complain principle is in-
troduced, forcing ﬁrms to explain to shareholders any deviations from the
best practice. Although the contents of the code largely overlap with Pe-
ters’s ideas, the enforcement is more promising.
8.1.3 Equity Financing and the Role of the 
Stock Market in Industrial Finance
The Amsterdam stock exchange was a sophisticated and active market
throughout the nineteenth century. The prolongatie system funneled large
amounts of savings to the market. The market was overcrowded, open and
competitive: the principle of unrestricted public access was carefully up-
held by the city authorities, and premises were shared with commodities
trading. However, the stock exchange did not initially play much of a direct
role in the ﬁnancing of industry. The bulk of the oﬃcial list seems to have
been made up of foreign state loans, American railway stocks, American
industrial shares, and colonial securities. The ﬁrst date at which domestic
industrial stock was oﬃcially listed on the Amsterdam stock exchange is
generally reported to be a brewery listing in 1889, though Jonker (1996)
suggests this date is misleading; four industrial issues (from a sugar reﬁn-
ery, a shipyard, and an engineering ﬁrm) were already quoted in the early
1880s. In any case a listing meant little before 1903, when listing require-
ments and a vetting process by the Vereeniging voor Eﬀectenhandel (set up
in 1876 to oversee the market and instill investor conﬁdence) were formal-
ized.
Meanwhile there was a large and active unlisted securities market on
which domestic securities were both auctioned and directly placed; an ex-
ample of a prime unlisted stock traded there during the last decades of
the nineteenth century is Heineken. Shares were often initially privately
placed, and Jonker (1996) cautions that a lack of domestic industrial stock
exchange listings should not be interpreted as a deﬁnitive indicator of in-
vestor disinterest. A number of NVs set up in the 1840s and 1850s found
ready backers; they did not seek a listing until the end of the century. By
1937–39, private placements still encompassed 16.6 percent of bond issues
and 4.8 percent of equity issues, and private “underhand” loans remained
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vestors’ portfolios still contained equal amounts of underhand loans and
listed securities (Renooij 1951, pp. 186 and 190). Clearly, then, the Am-
sterdam stock exchange was not the sole venue for primary issues or for
secondary trading. The dearth of domestic industrial listings cannot be in-
terpreted as a sign of structural impediments to equity ﬁnancing.
Van Zanden (1987, 1998) points out that external ﬁnance, albeit not ob-
tained from the general public, played a major part in the industrialization
of Amsterdam. Initially, money for capital-intensive new ventures would
be supplied by the city’s traditional trading elite. For example, merchants
set up two companies for steamship transport and shipbuilding in hopes of
stimulating trade. Similarly, rich and successful entrepreneurial dynasties
would move into related industries: for example, the proﬁts from sugar re-
ﬁning were plowed back into beer brewing and ﬂour milling concerns.
Meanwhile, the government and King William I at times provided crucial
credit lines. And in 1883 Amsterdam’s ﬁnancial elite contributed a capital
of f 0.5 million for a banking venture, the Finantieele Maatschappij voor
Nijverheidsondernemingen, whose explicit purpose was to provide ﬁnance
for industry in the form of credit, in anticipation of repayment when a
public share issue was completed.
Still, it is fair to say that infusions from a network of family, friends, and
business associates, complemented by retained earnings, were, in the
Netherlands as in most other countries, the dominant source of risk capi-
tal for much of industry in the late nineteenth century. For example, the
textile industry developing in the East and South of the country was almost
exclusively ﬁnanced in this way. The exception, rather than the rule, were
large, capital-intensive infrastructure projects like railways, which typi-
cally relied on an initial primary issue of shares to the general public, some-
times combined with some form of limited government support, to get oﬀ
the ground. The appendix describes the initial share ownership structure
following four nineteenth-century railway ﬂotations.
8.1.4 The Role of Banks
A surprising feature of Dutch ﬁnancial history (particularly when con-
trasted with the emergence of powerful universal banks in Germany in the
late nineteenth century) is the limited role played by banks in the ﬁnancing
of industrial growth, not just in the early period of industrialization of the
late nineteenth century but well into the twentieth century. Dutch eco-
nomic historians attribute the patchy record of late nineteenth-century
banking initiatives—banks were set up, but many failed, and the industry
remained exceedingly fragmented well into the twentieth century—to a
number of causes.
One major cause was the dominance of the prolongatie system of ﬁnanc-
ing, which ﬂourished throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth
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of it a rather unlikely source of industrial ﬁnance. As a legacy from the suc-
cesses of the Golden Age, the nineteenth-century Netherlands still had a
strong stock market culture and a well-developed network of local agents
(notaries, lawyers, and brokers) who would collect savings from wealthy in-
dividuals and channel them to the stock exchange. Much of the money was
not invested in securities directly but made available to ﬁrms or other in-
vestors in the form of short-term margin loans. These, though of course
callable at short notice, were typically rolled over or “prolonged,” whence
their name. They were backed by securities, commodities, or other ex-
change-traded collateral. Thus industry and trade in eﬀect obtained direct
short-term capital in a very fragmented way, via margin loans provided by
investors without the intermediation of a banking system. The prolongatie
loans were considered safe; the interest rate was attractive and roughly
tracked the London discount rate (hovering between 3 and 5 percent be-
tween 1820 and 1860; see Jonker 1996, ﬁgure 12.4, p. 96). The system worked
so smoothly that intermediation and liquidity transformation by a nascent
banking system was eﬀectively crowded out. This remained the case well
into the twentieth century, as argued by Jonker (1995). On the eve of World
War I, the amount outstanding on prolongatie at any point in time was
around 400 million guilders, more than double the known deposits of all the
banks taken together. Jonker (1996; see ﬁgure 9.2, p. 191) points out that the
short-term interest rate on the Amsterdam exchange remained at or above
the yield on government bonds until nearly 1920, eﬀectively precluding sub-
stantive proﬁtable deposit taking by banks. The prolongatie market did not
disappear until short rates fell dramatically toward the end of the 1920s.
Another brake on banking development was Dutch savers’ distrust of ﬁ-
nancial institutions. The sovereign bond defaults of the late eighteenth cen-
tury and the parlous state of government ﬁnances in the early nineteenth
century (with government debt hovering around a staggering 400 percent
of national income) meant that even the paper money circulated by the
Nederlandsche Bank (set up in 1814 at the behest of King Willem I, an en-
ergetic supporter of initiatives to revive the Dutch economy) was long con-
sidered an unsafe substitute for specie. Private banking institutions were
considered even more dubious, a view conﬁrmed when the ﬁrst wave of
new banking ventures of the 1860s was followed by several banking failures
in the long recessionary period starting in 1870.
The industrial boom that started in 1895 precipitated a period of intense
interest in industrial ﬁnance in the early twentieth century, right up until
1920. During this period many new companies were listed and public share
oﬀerings were readily absorbed. Banks, for this short period only, were pre-
pared to oﬀer long-term ﬁnancing to industry. Meanwhile, a wave of bank-
ing consolidation from 1911 onward, together with a major shakeout of
minor and regional banks in the crisis that started in 1920 (in 1920–22 a to-
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ﬁve banks was written oﬀ), left the general banking industry dominated by
the “Big Five” banks.
Financing for industry completely dried up in the deﬂationary 1920s and
did not revive until after World War II. Banks’ reluctance to provide long-
term ﬁnancing for industry was the subject of intense debate; while large
companies could ﬁll the gap by issuing stocks and bonds, small and
medium-sized enterprises were seriously constrained. The government
went so far as to attempt to set up a bank for industrial ﬁnance in 1935 (it
succumbed to the bad economic climate). The banks limited their role to
collecting deposits (though, as Jonker 1995 shows, in the interbellum years
Dutch banking deposits, and in particular time deposits, were still ex-
traordinarily low relative to the total money supply compared with neigh-
boring countries), making short-term loans (maturities of over three
months were avoided as much as possible), and underwriting new issues.
While they dominated the new issue market from the 1930s onward, they
acted only as a conduit, never retaining equity stakes in industry or mak-
ing long-term loan commitments.
In short, the Dutch banks most resembled the British banks, not the uni-
versal banks of neighboring Belgium and Germany, as stressed in Van
Goor and Koelewijn’s (1995) overview of Dutch banking in the twentieth
century. Dutch bankers focused on mercantile ﬁnance and consistently
veered away from long-term commitments. As “general” banks they did do
a lot of underwriting and investment banking business (also carried out by
some private specialized ﬁrms); there was no counterpart of the Glass-
Steagall Act formally mandating the separation of commercial and invest-
ment banking.
In 1945, the Herstelbank (bank for reconstruction), a joint venture be-
tween the government and the ﬁnancial sector, was set up to ﬁll the per-
ceived gap in ﬁnance for long-term investment by providing long-term
loans (a subsidiary, the Nationale Participatie Maatschappij, was created
to take equity stakes). It played an important role in the recovery of Dutch
industry over the decade following World War II. Perhaps its example (and
that of its various successors), together with other government policies,
stimulated the commercial banks’ slow evolution toward medium- and
long-term lending in the 1950–60 period. Meanwhile, banks did adhere to
the fundamental principle of nonengagement in industry; indeed, industry
spokesmen at the time explicitly expressed reservations about bank inﬂu-
ence on commercial and strategic decision making.
The boom years of 1955 to 1970 saw a period of increased diversiﬁcation,
as specialized institutions such as the mortgage banks lost ground. A spate
of large-scale bank mergers led to a fear that banks had too much market
power and were exposing themselves to an unacceptably wide range of risks.
Thus, starting in 1971 the Nederlandsche Bank, as industry regulator, put
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the Wet Toezicht Kredietwezen 1978) that prohibited mergers of general
banks with insurance companies or mortgage banks, restricted bank par-
ticipation in the equity of other companies (ﬁnancial or nonﬁnancial) to 5
percent without explicit permission from the NB, and limited the value of
share stakes held by banks to 60 percent of their capital.
The 1980s were a diﬃcult period of retrenchment for the banks, and
again the accusations that banks were excessively cautious led to the adop-
tion of various government measures (such as loan guarantees) to encour-
age the provision of risk-taking capital. Meanwhile the international ex-
pansion of Dutch industry brought with it a continuing trend toward the
formation of large banking conglomerates oﬀering a wider range of ﬁnan-
cial services.
In 1990 banking and insurance regulation was radically loosened. Par-
ticipation in the European Union (EU) has meant that Dutch banks’ mar-
ket power is no longer considered a threat. As an immediate consequence,
more mergers in 1991 created the three current giant banks (ABN-Amro,
ING Bank, and Rabobank). And restrictions on banking-insurance al-
liances were lifted in accordance with EU practice. This has led to the for-
mation of conglomerate groups holding substantial share stakes in large
numbers of companies. Thus, a gradual trend away from the Anglo-Saxon
model and toward a more Continental style of banking is in evidence.
8.1.5 Nonbank Institutional Investors: 
Insurance Companies and Pension Funds
Insurance companies and pension funds have played a role in taking eq-
uity stakes, absorbing bond issues, and providing long-term loans at least
since the beginning of the twentieth century. Our data for 1993 show that
both the ING Bank and the Aegon insurance group had substantial long-
term stakes in other companies (note that ING was formed in 1991 by a
merger involving, among others, the large insurance company Nationale
Nederlanden).
Institutional investors rose to a prominent place in the Dutch capital
markets during the early decades of the twentieth century.8 Traditionally,
nineteenth-century life insurers had invested primarily in securities that
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8. Renooij (1951, p. 63) reports ﬁgures illustrating the rising importance of such investors:
between 1900 and 1939, deposits with private savings banks rose from f 80 to f 515 million and
those with the state Rijkspostspaarbank from f 85 to f 670 million, while the capital of the life
insurance companies rose from f 130 to f 1,359 million. Meanwhile, various social insurance
funds were founded in the ﬁrst quarter of the century in response to social legislation, and by
1939 the Algemeen Burgerlijk Pensioenfonds (the government employees’ pension fund) held
f 794 million in assets, the railway workers’ and miners’ pension funds held a combined f 203
million, and private industry’s Ongevallenfonds and Invaliditeits- en Ouderdomsfonds to-
gether some f 491 million, while the self-employed workers’ voluntary Ouderdomsfonds B
held f 68 million.were judged to be particularly safe and liquid; many of them invested ex-
clusively in Dutch government bonds, and indeed many were restricted to
do so by their statutes. The twentieth century saw a gradual lifting of these
restrictions, but investment in private issuers’ securities remained only a
small fraction of their investments. In the pre–World War I burst of enthu-
siasm for industrialization, a typical life insurer, Eerste Nederlandsche, in-
vested as much as 4 percent of its assets in banking and 7 percent in man-
ufacturing securities; these were predominantly bonds rather than equity.
Interest in privately issued securities then dwindled down to almost zero,
until it revived in the late 1930s; by 1939, the precursor companies of Ae-
gon held about 5 percent of their assets in manufacturing company securi-
ties, while over time the balance had shifted from bonds to equity (Gales
1986). Still, around 1950 life insurers’ investment in industrial securities re-
mained modest, indeed, the proportion was lower than at the turn of the
century. Insurers did also make some contributions to industrial ﬁnance in
the form of direct long-term loans (onderhandse leningen)9 and mortgages.
But the trend toward equity and nongovernment bonds did not gather
force until the second half of the twentieth century.
Regarding pension funds, to illustrate their contribution to equity ﬁ-
nancing, consider the combined Philips pension funds, founded in 1913,
described in appendix 2d of Van Nederveen Meerkerk and Peet (2002).
Equity comprised a mere 2 percent of the fund’s total investment in 1925;
most of the fund was invested in (government) bonds. By 1950, equity took
a 7 percent share, rising to 28 percent in 1975 and 46 percent in 2000. By
then, the Philips pension fund was holding f 16,771 million in equity, to-
gether with f 106 million in venture participations. Here again we see very
modest interest in risk-bearing capital in the ﬁrst half of the century, with
a marked shift toward investment in corporate equity in the second half of
the century.
In any case, it does not seem to be the case that institutional equity own-
ership has been matched by an active role in corporate decision making.
The discussion surrounding the recent management crises at Ahold and
other major Dutch companies gives some insight into why the indepen-
dent, public-sector employee pension fund Algemeen Burgerlijk Pensioen-
fonds (ABP) is one of the few Dutch institutional investors to attempt an
activist stance. As pointed out by an insurance company spokesman,
banks and insurance companies are not only shareholders; for them, the
ﬁrm in which they invest is at the same time a (potential) client: “You are
in a diﬃcult position if you want to present a new contract to the manage-
ment board whilst you have voted against one of their proposals the day be-
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9. These were exempt from stamp duty until 1939 and hence a popular substitute for bonds
in the interwar period. The major place taken by direct long-term private loans in institu-
tional investors’ portfolios is distinctive to the Netherlands and Germany.fore.”10 Meanwhile, activism by private companies’ pension funds is likely
to be reined in by the parent company’s management, in return for recip-
rocal restraint by their counterparts’ pension funds. Institutional share-
holder activism thus remains somewhat limited in scope and potential.
8.2 Empirical Analysis: The Data
8.2.1 The Sample of Firms
Our study focuses on all domestic ﬁrms that have equity oﬃcially listed
on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange in the years examined. It should be
pointed out that this concept is somewhat diﬀerent from the usual deﬁni-
tion of “listed ﬁrms” for the Netherlands, which also includes ﬁrms whose
bonds only are listed. Traditionally, many of the security issues listed and
traded on the Amsterdam exchange have been bonds; though the propor-
tion of listed ﬁrms that list only their bonds and not their stock as well is
relatively small (for example, 17 percent in 1910). One reason to exclude
these ﬁrms from our sample is that they are somewhat less likely to comply
with the obligation to publish annual accounts.
The universe of ﬁrms for which we present data also excludes the ﬁnan-
cial sector. In 1923 this sector comprised mainly banks and mortgage
banks. In the second half of the century insurance ﬁrms and collective in-
vestment vehicles such as mutual funds are important additional con-
stituents of this group. Our main data sources for information about the
nonﬁnancial ﬁrms are Van Oss’s Eﬀectenboek for 1923 and 1958 (Van Oss
1924, 1959) and the electronic database REACH (Review and Analysis of
Companies in Holland) for 1993.
It should be noted that many of the largest Dutch ﬁrms are not listed, so
that our sample cannot be said to represent all the most important Dutch
companies. Sluyterman and Winkelman (1993) identify the 100 largest
Dutch ﬁrms in terms of their assets. Even though they point out that their
methodology probably underrepresents privately held ﬁrms because their
balance sheet data are harder to obtain and their accounting practices are
generally more conservative, they still ﬁnd that only about three-fourths of
these ﬁrms are listed. Agricultural ﬁrms (and their food-processing out-
growths) in particular are often organized as cooperatives, as are the banks
that specialize in agricultural loans (the Rabobank and its precursors).
8.2.2 The Three Sample Years
Our data were gathered for three years spaced at thirty-ﬁve-year inter-
vals: 1923, 1958, and 1993. In choosing these particular years we were in-
ﬂuenced by three considerations.
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10. The speaker is D. Brilleslijper, Delta Lloyd spokesman, in FEM Business,20 September
2003.First, we would like to have years that were in some sense typical of an
epoch. The year 1923 comes toward the end of the ﬁrst great boom in in-
dustrial development; it is still a year of relative prosperity, predating the
subsequent collapse in share prices, the Depression, and the Second World
War. In 1958 the economic dislocation wrought by the war has receded:
postwar reconstruction is virtually complete, and a new era of prosperity
and growth has set in. Meanwhile, 1993 is a year in which the impact of EU
membership has already shaped many developments.
A second consideration is the availability of data. For example, large
ownership stakes were only available following the 1991 disclosure law
(Wet Melding Zeggenschapsrecht), which came into eﬀect in February
1992 (De Jong et al. 2001). This makes 1993 an interesting year to study.
Finally, our aim was to try to pick years that as much as possible enabled
us to complement rather than duplicate the available body of work on
Dutch economic history.
8.2.3 Data Availability
For most limited-liability companies, the publication of annual accounts
was not legally required in the Netherlands until 1928. However, from 1909
the stock exchange’s Fondensreglement required all companies that
wished to list their stocks or bonds to make available to shareholders an-
nual published accounts comprising the balance sheet and proﬁt- and loss
statements. By 1910, about 80 percent of listed ﬁrms complied in whole or
in part, though the level of compliance was considerably lower (around 50
percent) among manufacturing ﬁrms. By 1923, our ﬁrst sample year, com-
pliance (as measured by the availability of accounts in Van Oss’ Eﬀecten-
boek) had risen considerably.
Information on share ownership prior to the share ownership disclosure
law of 1991, the Wet Melding Zeggenschapsrecht (WMZ), is very hard to
obtain because as a rule Dutch public listed companies issue bearer, not
registered, shares, and we have no easy access to public registries to trace
share ownership. In principle, some information about share ownership
can be retrieved from company archives. In particular the records of share-
holder meetings would give insight into, at least, the identities of share-
holders actively involved in decisions about the company. Such archival re-
search, however, is far beyond the scope of this paper.
Thus, for 1923 and 1958 the only way we investigate family inﬂuence and
control is by tracking the identities of the management and the board of di-
rectors, both available for much of the late nineteenth and the twentieth
centuries from published sources.11
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11. This information is in principle available for all public limited companies (naamloze ven-
nootschappen) from both the yearbooks of NVs compiled by Van Nierop and Baak over the
period 1880–1948 and from the yearbooks relating to listed securities, Van Oss’s Eﬀectenboek
1903–78 (later continued as Eﬀectenboek).8.2.4 Summary Statistics
As shown in table 8.1, the number of ﬁrms on the Amsterdam Stock Ex-
change’s oﬃcial list has actually declined over the last few decades studied.
The decline in numbers is oﬀset by a substantial increase in size; the aver-
age book value of assets increased more than a hundredfold over the sev-
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Table 8.1 Summary statistics
1923 1958 1993
Book value total assets ( f 1,000) 13,673 79,700 2,286,000
(3,158) (9,314) (360,000)
Past three-year growth book value total assets –0.077 0.161 0.170
(–0.074) (0.102) (0.080)
No. of observations 303 318 141
Tobin’s q 0.372 0.421 1.270
(0.338) (0.411) (1.132)
No. of observations 214 245 143
Return on assets 0.073 0.159 0.073
(0.047) (0.113) (0.074)
No. of observations 317 321 143
Four-year standard deviation ROA 0.037 0.032
n.a. (0.024) (0.023)
No. of observations 298 141
Payout ratio 0.375 0.716 0.369
(0.311) (0.440) (0.363)
No. of observations 300 323 143
Debt to total assets 0.300 0.339 0.535
(0.280) (0.325) (0.536)
Fixed assets to total assets 0.552 0.404 0.381
(0.578) (0.352) (0.355)
Cash and liquid assets to total assets 0.114 0.124 0.107
(0.050) (0.084) (0.041)
Age 21.80 47.12 48.75
(18) (46) (36)
No. of observations 317 333 84
Managerial board size 2.158 2.318 2.776
(2) (2) (2)
Supervisory board size 4.874 4.540 5.167
(5) (4) (5)
Family ﬁrm: (former) ﬁrm name equals board 
member’s surname (%) 28.1 27.6 6.3
Family ﬁrm: at least two board members with 
same surname (%) 31.5 29.1 5.6
Family ﬁrm based on both criteria (%) 16.4 16.2 1.3
Family ﬁrm based on at least one criterion (%) 43.2 40.5 10.4
No. of ﬁrms 317 333 143
Notes:Medians are reported in parentheses below the means. n.a. not available. ROA re-
turn on assets.enty years from 1923 to 1993, a period during which prices (as measured
by the gross domestic product [GDP] deﬂator) rose by a factor of 12. To
some extent these trends are attributable to mergers and consolidation, but
a tendency to limit the exchange’s oﬃcial list to very large and liquid com-
panies may also play a role.
The data regarding the three-year growth in assets show that 1923 fol-
lowed upon a diﬃcult period; indeed, there had been a serious economic
downturn, and overall stock market equity prices had fallen by about one-
half during the immediately preceding decade.
That Tobin’s q was extremely low in 1923 is not surprising; however, the
low average value of 0.421 for 1958 is less easily explained. Tobin’s qis mea-
sured as the ratio of market value of total assets to book value of total as-
sets. The market value of total assets is measured as book value of total as-
sets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity. A problem
arises here, because the book and market values of equity need to be “com-
parable.” Especially in 1923, many ﬁrms have multiple types of equity. The
market value is not available for each type of equity. In 1923 and 1958, we
leave the types of equity for which we have no market prices in book value
terms and attributed reserves to equity types on a pro rata and book value
basis.
The median return on assets (ROA) ﬂuctuated between a low of 4.7 per-
cent in 1923 and a high of 11.3 percent in 1958, down to 7.4 percent in
1993. The ROA in 1923 is the ratio of net proﬁts to equity; in other years it
is operating income to book value total assets.
The median payout ratio of 0.31 that we obtain for 1923 is somewhat on
the low side in both historical and international perspective. In the nine-
teenth century, the norm was to pay out most or all of earnings, perhaps
with some retentions from extraordinary proﬁts to create a reserve for use
in smoothing dividends in bad years. In the ﬁrst two decades of the twen-
tieth century, it gradually became accepted practice to retain earnings for
the purpose of expansion. However, payout ratios were generally still very
high, and Post (1972, table 5) cites a payout ratio of 0.78 in 1923 for all
Dutch NVs (not just listed ones). One point to note is that 1923 was not a
good year for the economy, coming at the end of the depression of 1921–
23. Many of the ﬁrms in our data set made losses, and nearly half of the
ﬁrms passed their dividend; the median payout ratio for the ﬁrms that did
pay out a nonzero dividend was 0.75, which is very close to Post’s ﬁgure.
Our data source, Van Oss’ Eﬀectenboek, sometimes gives fairly detailed
information about the disposition of proﬁts, both as stipulated in the com-
pany charters and as carried out ex post. A striking feature of the 1923 data
is the substantial proportion that is statutorily destined for the executives
and directors in the form of tantièmes or proﬁt-sharing agreements. The
norm for statutory payouts of this nature is in the region of 15 percent of
proﬁts, which suggests that such payments should perhaps be interpreted
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rather than just as remuneration for executive eﬀort. But in practice the ac-
tual payments made often fall far short of the proﬁt-sharing payouts stip-
ulated ex ante in the company statutes.
By 1958 the mean (median) payout ratio was 0.72 (0.44), declining to 0.37
(0.36) in 1993. Payout ratios declined secularly until the 1980s, as ﬁrms chose
to retain earnings to ﬁnance expansion. A probable contributing factor was
the introduction of a corporation tax, phased in around 1941. A classical
system is in force: corporate earnings are taxed at 35 percent, whether dis-
tributed or not, and dividends are subsequently taxed as personal income at
a heavy 60 percent marginal rate, while there is no capital gains tax. Indeed,
of the thirty-three countries studied by La Porta et al. (2000), the Nether-
lands tax regime has the rock-bottom ratio of net-of-tax payout from divi-
dends relative to capital gains. Accordingly, one would expect Dutch per-
sonal investors to have little enthusiasm for dividend payouts and a
preference for retained earnings. Such a preference would be less likely on
the part of those institutional investors that are exempted from income tax.
While the Dutch tax system does not attempt to mitigate the double taxa-
tion of dividends at the corporate and personal income tax levels, it has tra-
ditionally been exceptionally careful in ensuring that intercorporate divi-
dends are not double-taxed at the corporate level. This feature of the tax
regime is one reason why the Netherlands (and in particular the Netherlands
Antilles) is popular as a base for international holding companies.
Leverage as measured by the ratio of debt to total assets exhibits a
marked increase from a median of 0.32 in 1958 to 0.54 in 1993. Again, the
corporate tax shield from debt may explain this increase in leverage in the
postwar half-century.
The sizes of the managerial and supervisory boards remained fairly con-
stant over the seventy-year period studied.
Meanwhile, founding family inﬂuence seems to have declined dramati-
cally. Our proxies for family inﬂuence are two: one is the presence of board
members with the founding family surname; the other is multiple board
members with a common surname. These indicators of family presence de-
clined only slightly from 1923 to 1958, but there was a large reduction from
1958 to 1993. Both criteria for family inﬂuence dropped by a factor of about
5, from roughly 30 percent to 6 percent, leaving a total of only 10.4 percent
of ﬁrms in 1993 still exhibiting one or both indicators of family inﬂuence.
8.3 Oligarchic Clauses and Takeover Defenses
8.3.1 Description of Takeover Defenses and Shareholder Rights
Dutch corporations are insulated against the threat of hostile takeovers
byan array of unusually strong and somewhat idiosyncratic defense mech-
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and attempt to trace their historical origins. It should be pointed out at the
outset that ever since 1881, Dutch corporate law does not permit the use of
nonvoting or lower-voting shares, thus ruling out one obvious means of
detaching control from ownership. Moreover, early Dutch corporate law
from 1838 onward mandated voting caps in order to protect minority
shareholders from oppression by a dominant shareholder: one person
should not have more than six (three) votes in a company with more (less)
than a hundred shares. This means that before the new law of 1928, pyra-
mids or large majority stakes were not a secure means of entrenching con-
trol, necessitating the development of alternative safeguards.
As a small country surrounded by powerful and at times warring neigh-
bors, it should not be surprising that vulnerability to foreign inﬂuence has
always been a source of serious concern among Dutch industrialists, par-
ticularly in the early part of the twentieth century. A number of defensive
measures have been rationalized on this basis. As mentioned earlier, the
Dutch stakeholder model (poldermodel) also induced a movement that
shifted shareholder power to independent supervisory board members.
Statutory Defenses
Bystatutory defenseswemean those that are enshrined in the company’s
statutes. Among the statutory defenses, those that restrict the powers of the
algemene vergadering van aandeelhouders (AVA) or shareholders’ meeting
are known as oligarchische regelingen (oligarchic measures/arrangements/
devices). Such clauses give all or part of the control of the company to oth-
ers than to the shareholders representing the majority of the capital at the
shareholder meetings.
The most prominent oligarchic device is the use of prioriteitsaandelenor
priority shares13with statutorily deﬁned extra powers of decision within the
corporation. Such shares were ﬁrst introduced in 1898, when the main
Dutch oil company operating in the Netherlands Indies (the progenitor of
Royal Dutch/Shell) changed its statutes to ward oﬀ the threat of foreign
inﬂuence. Such shares are often associated with a right of bindende voor-
dracht(binding proposal) in the nomination of management and directors.
Other oligarchic devices include arrangements to allocate decision-
making powers to another organ of the company (such as the board or the
priority shareholders) for explicitly speciﬁed important classes of deci-
sions that would normally require shareholder approval: such matters can
include the composition of management and board, their remuneration,
dividend payout policy, modiﬁcation of company statutes, or dissolution
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12. Our description is based on Voogd’s (1989) detailed investigation of Dutch companies’
statutory defenses.
13. Confusingly, such shares were initially known as “preference shares,” but this usage is
now no longer allowed. They are also sometimes called “founders’ shares” or, say, “A-shares.”of the company. Finally, there are devices such as voting restrictions and
strengthened supermajority and quorum requirements for shareholder
meeting decision making.
Since World War II the issue of shares into friendly hands, and in partic-
ular of preference shares (preferente aandelen), has developed into a major
defensive strategy. This is a nonoligarchic statutory device in that it at-
tempts to inﬂuence the composition of the shareholder meeting rather
than restricting its powers. From 1949 to 1981 there were some twenty-six
instances where companies defensively issued ordinary shares to friendly
individuals, banks, institutional investors, potential merger partners, or al-
lied foundations. The motive for such defensive issues was to dilute the
power of large shareholders, preserve independence in the face of a hostile
takeover attempt, or ensure takeover by a white knight. The use of ordinary
shares for defensive purposes waned after the mid-1970s because the issue
of ordinary shares is costly in terms of cash requirements (the issue price
must be fair to existing shareholders, and for registered shares, a down pay-
ment of at least 25 percent of the nominal value plus 100 percent of the
agio, the diﬀerence between the issue price and the nominal value, is re-
quired), frowned upon by legal commentators, and much circumscribed by
the adjustments to Dutch company law made in 1981 to implement the
Second European Directive on Company Law. In particular, the new law
gave preemptive rights to participate in ordinary share issues to existing
shareholders, unless the shareholders’ meeting explicitly waived the right;
and a ﬁve-year expiration limit was placed on any allocation of the power
to make issue decisions to organs other than the shareholders’ meeting.14
In the early 1970s preference shares quickly replaced ordinary shares as
the instrument of choice for defensive issues. Provisions for issuing prefer-
enceshares for defensive purposes ﬁrst appeared in the statutes of a Dutch
company, Rijn-Schelde, in 1969. There were two reasons for the switch to
preference shares. First, under the new law, ordinary shareholders do not
automatically have preemption rights to new issues of preference shares
(though the stock exchange did attempt to impose on listed companies a
shareholder approval requirement for issues of preference shares of more
than 50 percent of the existing capital). Second, preference shares can be
designed to provide a much larger ratio of voting power to paid-in capital
than ordinary shares; indeed, the net outlay can be made essentially negli-
gible. Preference shares can be issued more or less at par, if liquidation
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14. Even so, Voogd (1989) ﬁnds that on January 1, 1988, 59 percent of the companies on the
stock exchange’s oﬃcial list had statutes empowering an organ other than the shareholders’
meeting to issue ordinary shares (in 76 percent of these cases, the management; in 15 percent,
the priority shareholders; in 8 percent, the board of directors; and in 1 percent, the board and
management jointly), while 51 percent of companies had made similar arrangements for the
power to deny preemptive rights to shareholders (distributed 74 percent, 17 percent, 8 per-
cent, and 1 percent respectively among the various alternative organs).rights are limited to the paid-in capital and the preferred dividend is suit-
ably tied to the market interest rate. If the legal minimum of 25 percent of
par value is paid in, the number of votes obtained for any paid-in sum of
money is maximized. But that is not all. The preference shares are gener-
ally placed with ﬁnancial institutions, institutional investors, or a founda-
tion specially set up for the purpose. For such a foundation to be self-
ﬁnancing it would need to borrow the amount required for paid-in capital;
therefore the dividend on the preference shares must be carefully tied to the
required interest on the loan, and cumulative preference rights are neces-
sary to ensure that the foundation can reasonably be expected to meet its
obligations. Voogd (1989) found that 48 percent of the listed companies he
examined had defensive preference shares, deﬁned as preference shares that
were op naam (registered) and not aan toonder (bearer) shares, not fully
paid in, with limited dividend and liquidation rights, and with dividend
rights tied to the market interest rate. Of the companies issuing defensive
preference shares, 66 percent had issued preference shares equal to 100
percent of the authorized ordinary shares, thus carrying 50 percent of vot-
ing power (20 percent of companies had preference shares ranging between
50 and 100 percent of the ordinary shares, and only 14 percent of compa-
nies issued 50 percent or less).
A further device for inﬂuencing the composition of the shareholder base
is the issue of registered (op naam) shares15together with limitations on the
transfer or ownership of such shares. Such blocking devices (blokker-
ingsregeling) can include a requirement for permission from a company or-
gan for the transfer of shares, a requirement to oﬀer shares to fellow share-
holders before selling them to third parties, or statutory limitations on who
can own the shares (Dutch nationals, residents, etc.).
Finally, an important statutory defensive device is the X percent rule (X
percent-regeling), which limits the ownership of shares (usually the ordi-
nary shares, which are normally the ones that are listed and that thus
change hands often) by a single shareholder. Voogd (1989) ﬁnds that 25
percent of listed companies (excluding mutual funds) have such a rule in
their statutes. Usually the company’s shares are registered (op naam) and
placed with a specially created foundation or administratiekantoor, which
issues nonvoting bearer certiﬁcates that are listed on the stock exchange.
These are freely exchangeable into voting shares, but only up to the speci-
ﬁed X percent boundary.
Other less common statutory defensive measures include voting limits,
though as these can be circumvented by the use of straw men, they are now
out of favor. All twelve oﬃcially listed companies that included voting caps
in their statutes in early 1988 were ones already in existence before 1929;
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15. Such shares cannot be listed; typically, these companies issue bearer certiﬁcates that are
traded on the stock exchange.taken together, these companies represented around 40 percent of the mar-
ket value of Amsterdam listed companies (Voogd 1989). Some corporate
statutes include a varied brew of other measures limiting voting rights to
long-term shareholders, Dutch nationals, and so on.
Nonstatutory Defenses
A classic and quite common nonstatutory defense mechanism is the use
of an administratiekantoor (AK), typically a special-purpose foundation
that owns all or most of the company’s shares and issues nonvoting certiﬁ-
cates to the general public. The certiﬁcates carry all the underlying shares’
economic rights (dividends, liquidation value, etc.) but no control rights.
Especially in cases where these certiﬁcates are niet royeerbaar—that is, not
exchangeable for ordinary vote-carrying shares—the eﬀect is to give all
voting power to the trustees of the AK, who are typically closely inter-
twined with the company’s management, although the stock exchange im-
poses some independence requirements on the AK.16 From the mid-ﬁfties
onward the increasing use of certiﬁcation of this kind has been roundly
criticized from many quarters, including the legal profession and the
Vereniging voor de Eﬀectenhandel, the securities dealers’ association run-
ning the stock exchange. Since 1992, listings of niet-royeerbare certiﬁcates
are not allowed anymore. In a recent adaption of Dutch company law, all
certiﬁcate holders are allowed to vote by proxy with their certiﬁcates. Only
under special circumstances (in case voting by certiﬁcate holders interferes
with the general interests of the ﬁrm) can the proxy voting be refused or
limited.
The use of pyramidal holding companies to concentrate control is rela-
tively rare in the Netherlands, given that certiﬁcation is a readily available
means of securing control without any appreciable outlay of capital. How-
ever, a small number of such holding company constructionsdo exist,17and
with certiﬁcation likely to be phased out, pyramids may become more
prevalent. Similarly, cross-shareholdings along the French model are un-
usual but not unknown in the Netherlands.
The Structured Regime
In 1971, the “structured regime” was imposed on all large companies
with a large number of employees in the Netherlands. The primary reason
for its introduction was to give workers some power of consultation and in-
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16. For example, at a chaotic shareholder meeting for Ahold in September 2003, 97 percent
of votes supported a remuneration package for the incoming CEO that was widely denounced
as excessively generous. No representatives of the AK were present; before even knowing the
broad scope of the remuneration proposal, they had already authorized the secretary of the
management board to exercise their votes, representing 50 percent of the total.
17. Most notably, Heineken, where the Heineken family has 50.01 percent control of the un-
listed Heineken Holding NV, which in turn controls the listed ﬁrm Heineken NV with 50.01
percent.ﬂuence through the ondernemingsraad(workers’ council). In addition, some
of the powers normally given to the shareholders’ meeting (such as man-
agement appointments and the approval of the annual accounts), as well as
the power to approve a set of other important management decisions, were
vested in the raad van commissarissen(supervisory board), which appointed
its own members by a system of co-optation that basically bypassed any
shareholder inﬂuence. An exemption for the structured regime is allowed
for multinational companies with a majority of employees working abroad.
Also, companies that do not meet the criteria for compulsory subjection to
the structured regime can still voluntarily apply it. Many have chosen to
adopt the regime voluntarily or not to abolish the regime when as a result of
international expansion the percentage of foreign workers passed the 50
percent threshold. The structured regime gives corporate insiders much
more freedom at the expense of shareholder rights. Under very speciﬁc con-
ditions ﬁrms have to adopt the mitigated structured regime, where the pow-
ers to appoint management and approve annual accounts would normally
remain with the shareholders’ meeting, although the co-optation system for
supervisory board appointments remains in place.
Recently, the structured regime has been a topic of public debate. The in-
ﬂuence given to employees via the ondernemingsraad is quite weak; a re-
cently adopted proposal for the revision of the regime includes reserving
positions on the supervisory board for employee appointees, a move that
will clearly enhance worker power. At the same time the structured
regime’s allocation of shareholders’ normal powers to an unaccountable,
self-perpetuating supervisory board is the target of heavy criticism. A
prominent Dutch legal scholar, Jaap Winter, has gone so far as to describe
the structured regime as a “cynical compromise”18 that transfers share-
holder rights to corporate insiders without giving employees or sharehold-
ers any real decision-making powers.
8.3.2 Data and Analysis
Our data enable us to give an overview in table 8.2 of the takeover de-
fenses employed by the companies in our sample; in the Netherlands, take-
over protection has traditionally been very strong. Our sources are Van
Oss’s Eﬀectenboekfor 1923 and 1958 (S. F. van Oss 1924, 1959) and for 1993
the Gids bij de Oﬃciële Prijscourant (J. H. de Bussy 1993a).
One of the most prominent mechanisms, priority shares, has increased
dramatically in importance; by 1993 43 percent of ﬁrms had such shares.19
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18. “The starting point was the idea that labor and capital were equally valuable, and both
should have equal power. In reality a cynical compromise was reached: the heart of their pow-
ers has been taken away from the shareholders, while little more was received by employees”
(FEM Business, 13 September 2004).
19. The low ﬁgure for 1923 should be treated with some caution, as the nomenclature for
priority or founders’ shares was somewhat less clearly established.Meanwhile, voting limits were, in 1923, still a feature of all ﬁrms by law.
Their prevalence in the statutes of listed ﬁrms had fallen to 6.3 percent by
1993, and in most cases these were ﬁrms surviving from the pre-1928 pe-
riod when statutory voting limits were mandatory.20
The use of certiﬁcates or depository receipts has increased substantially
over time; 38 percent of ﬁrms had some measure of certiﬁcation present in
1993, rising steadily from 12 percent in 1923. A joint ownership construc-
tion was present in 3.5 percent of ﬁrms by 1993.
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Table 8.2 Takeover defenses and ownership structure (%)
1923 1958 1993
Priority shares  2.52 28.23 42.66
Voting limits  (By law) 0.30 6.29
Certiﬁcates 11.67 24.92 38.46
Limited or fully exchangeable certiﬁcates  8.52 18.02
Not exchangeable  5.71 3.50
X arrangement  10.49
Certiﬁcates and traded ordinary shares  10.76 21.62 2.10
Joint ownership construction  2.10 3.50
Preference shares (antitakeover)  60.14





Largest outside blockholder  24.49
All outside blockholders  43.10
Ownership identity of blocks
Banks 7.16
(77 nonzero)
Insurance companies  2.75
(50 nonzero)




Industrial ﬁrms  12.58
(51 nonzero)
Managerial board members  5.31
(20 nonzero)
Supervisory board members  2.47
(12 nonzero)
No. of ﬁrms 317 333 143
20. In 1958 it is possible that Van Oss does not contain complete information about voting
limits. Therefore, the percentage reported is likely to underestimate the actual presence.The issue of preference shares is a crucial defensive strategy in takeover
situations. The use of preference shares for defensive purposes was initi-
ated in 1969; by 1993, 60 percent of listed industrial ﬁrms had this defen-
sive mechanism in place.
The structured regime, which gives some inﬂuence to the workers’ coun-
cil and devolves much of the authority of the shareholders’ meeting to a
self-constituted supervisory board, was introduced in 1971. By 1993, 53
percent of listed industrial ﬁrms were subject to the structured regime, and
10 percent of these had voluntarily chosen to have the structured regime
apply.
Table 8.7 in section 8.4.3 compares and contrasts the prevalence of
takeover defenses in family and nonfamily ﬁrms. The main distinction is
that in family ﬁrms there are more likely to be priority shares, conferring
upon the holders of these shares a varying set of decision-making powers
that would otherwise fall upon the ordinary shareholders’ meeting.
For 1993, ownership data are available, and it is possible to investigate
the interactions between takeover defenses and ownership structure. Table
8.8 in section 8.4.3 shows that, on the whole, takeover defenses and con-
centrated ownership are substitute control mechanisms and thus nega-
tively correlated. Large outside block holders are negatively correlated
with all defense mechanisms considered, and signiﬁcantly so with the use
of defensive preference shares and priority shares. Similarly, when man-
agement board members hold large stakes, certiﬁcates are less likely to be
used. The results regarding the structured regime need to be interpreted
with caution as it is generally compulsory for the largest ﬁrms. Such ﬁrms
are less likely to be heavily management owned and more likely to be par-
tially owned by a bank. The ﬁnding that takeover defenses and concen-
trated ownership are substitutes rather than complements agrees with ear-
lier work by De Jong and Moerland (1999).
Table 8.9 in section 8.4.3 explores the impact of takeover defenses on
corporate performance by regressing Tobin’s q cross-sectionally on dum-
mies for the presence of the various common defense mechanisms (the
third column of results for each of the three sample years in table 8.9). Ear-
lier research by De Jong, Moerland, and Nijman (2000) on a cross section
of ﬁfty listed Dutch ﬁrms suggests that defense mechanisms such as cer-
tiﬁcates, defensive preference shares, and, most signiﬁcantly, the struc-
tured regime do reduce other performance measures such as the stock mar-
ket return and the return on equity; they ﬁnd that only the size of the
supervisory board has a signiﬁcant, negative impact on Tobin’s q. De Jong
et al. (2004) conﬁrm these results for a sample of all Dutch listed ﬁrms over
1993–99. In our larger sample, again, there is not much evidence of an im-
pact of defense mechanisms on q, though in 1958 the presence of priority
shares seems somewhat detrimental.
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8.4.1 Boards and Networks
In this section we will focus on the phenomenon of interlocking direc-
torates—that is, of having the same individual occupy board seats in mul-
tiple ﬁrms. Two aspects of this practice will be looked at.
First, the number of appointments per board member is studied. Mem-
bers with multiple appointments may have reputational capital; that is,
they may be excellent managers or monitors. On the other hand, multiple
appointments may reduce the time available for individual ﬁrms, reducing
the eﬀectiveness. Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard (2003) provide recent
evidence in U.S. ﬁrms and ﬁnd no negative eﬀects of multiple appoint-
ments. For the Netherlands, there is no evidence relating network relation-
ships to ﬁrm performance but a wealth of descriptive evidence regarding
interlocking directorates. To name but two prominent studies, Schijf
(1993) describes networks in 1886 and 1902 and Stokman, Wasseur, and
Elsas (1985) focus on networks in 1976 in the context of an international
comparative project.
A second aspect of interlocking directorates that is of particular interest
is the relation between banks and nonﬁnancial ﬁrms. Bank relations may
bring expertise to the board of nonﬁnancial ﬁrms. Besides, bank relations
may oﬀer monitoring, which reduces contracting costs. On the other hand,
banks may abuse their power and information to expropriate wealth from
other lenders and shareholders; recent studies on U.S. ﬁrms are Booth and
Deli (1999) and Kroszner and Strahan (2001). The relations between banks
and nonﬁnancials have been studied in the Netherlands by, among others,
Van den Broeke (1988) and Jonker (1989). Van den Broeke selects four in-
dustrial ﬁrms and one bank and describes the interlocking directorships.
The bank, Rotterdamsche Bankvereeniging, has joint board members with
three out of four ﬁrms through eight interlocks in the period 1918–39, even
though throughout this period it did not make a single long-term loan to
any of the ﬁrms concerned, in line with Dutch banking practice at the time.
Jonker (1989) selects eight banks and measures interlocks with nonﬁnan-
cial exchange-listed ﬁrms in 1910, 1923, 1931, and 1940. For example, in
1923, the eight banks had forty-three board members and these persons
held 431 board positions outside the banks.
Interlocking directorships can involve both executive and supervisory
board members. Dutch ﬁrms have dual board systems on the German
model. The ﬁrst tier comprises the executive board (Directeuren or Raad
van Bestuur), the management team that is responsible for the ﬁrm’s strat-
egy and daily operations. These executives are supervised by the sec-
ond tier, the supervisory board (Raad van Commissarissen or Raad van
Toezicht).
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p. 34). Nonetheless, all exchange-listed ﬁrms in 1923 do have a supervisory
board. The members are normally appointed by the shareholders’ meeting.
In special cases, the owners of preferred shares, priority shares, or bonds
have the right to appoint all or a limited number of supervisors. Interme-
diate arrangements existed where other parties than the shareholders pro-
pose members, while the shareholders can reject the proposal.
In 1993, a supervisory board is a legal obligation for ﬁrms that adopt the
so-called structuurregeling or structured regime, introduced in 1971. This
regime is compulsory for ﬁrms that meet size criteria (in particular, those
that have more than a cutoﬀ number of domestic employees). In 1993,
again, all the listed ﬁrms have supervisory boards.
8.4.2 Data Sources
Our aim is to describe the relevance of interlocks for nonﬁnancial ﬁrms.
First, we describe the interlocks with other nonﬁnancial ﬁrms. Second, we
focus on interlocks between banks and nonﬁnancials.
The focus for nonﬁnancial ﬁrms is simply on all exchange-listed ﬁrms.
For 1923 and 1958 we use Van Oss’s Eﬀectenboek (S. F. van Oss 1924,
1959). For 1993 we mainly use REACH and Jaarboek van Nederlandse On-
dernemingen (J. H. de Bussy 1993b).
For the identiﬁcation of board members of banks we do not want to re-
strict ourselves to listed banks because, especially in 1923, several impor-
tant banks were unlisted partnerships. Therefore we select the largest
banks. For 1923 we use the Financieel Adresboek voor Nederland issued by
J. H. de Bussy (1923). This book contains the section Financiëele instellin-
gen in Nederland, which includes for each ﬁnancial institution its name, its
placed equity and reserves, and the names of its board members. The book
includes listed and nonlisted institutions. For 1958 we use the same book
(J. H. de Bussy 1958) and collect bank information from the section Bank-
en credietwezen. For 1993 we use Omzetcijfers 1993, issued in 1994 by Het
Financieele Dagblad. This guide contains the banks and other ﬁnancial
institutions in the Netherlands, including total assets. The board members
of most banks are in the Jaarboek van Nederlandse Ondernemingen and, if
not, are obtained from annual reports.
For 1923 we identify 504 banks, of which 423 banks have available a
book value of equity (placed equity plus reserves). Total equity value is
1,319 million guilders. The ﬁrst 60 ﬁrms have 1,213 million guilders of eq-
uity value, or 92 percent of the total. The smallest ﬁrm in the selection of
60 has equity worth 200,000 guilders. Of these 60, 32 are listed on the Am-
sterdam stock exchange. The 5 largest banks have 49 percent of the total
equity value, and the 10 largest have 67 percent.
In 1958, we traced 148 banks, with total equity value of 1,099 million
guilders. The largest 50 banks have 96 percent (1,061 million guilders). The
Financing and Control in The Netherlands 4935 largest banks have 48 percent of the total equity value, and the 10 largest
have 69 percent.
In 1993, we have seventy-one banks (general and savings banks), and for
ﬁfty-six we have a book value of total assets. Total value is 1,309,788 mil-
lion guilders. We select the ten largest banks but exclude two banks for gov-
ernmental ﬁnancing. We also include three smaller banks that are known
for long-standing relations with nonﬁnancials. The eleven banks have a to-
tal asset value of 1,084,151 guilders, or 91 percent (excluding governmen-
tal banks). The diﬀerence with 1923 is striking and in particular caused by
the dominance of three large banks: ABN-AMRO, Rabobank, and ING.
8.4.3 Results and Analysis
Table 8.3 describes the interlocks of board members of nonﬁnancial
listed ﬁrms for 1923, 1958, and 1993.
The ﬁrst six rows in table 8.3 describe our sample of (nonﬁnancial) ﬁrms
and banks. The average board size has ﬂuctuated somewhat: the average
total number of board members per ﬁrm decreased slightly from 7.03 in
1923 to 6.86 in 1958, increasing by 1 to 7.94 by 1993. It is important to no-
tice that the number of banks in our sample declines from ﬁfty-seven to
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Table 8.3 Boards and interlocks
1923 1958 1993
Number of ﬁrms 317 333 143
Number of managerial board members 684 772 397
Number of supervisory board members 1,545 1,512 739
Number of banks 57 50 12
Number of managerial board members 238 159 60
Number of supervisory board members 432 361 122
Firms: number of managerial board members
With one interlock 137 127 38
With two interlocks 56 38 13
With three interlocks 32 21 6
With four interlocks 39 6 3
With ﬁve interlocks 11 19 0
With more than ﬁve interlocks 61 25 0
Total interlocks 1,248 599 94
Average number of interlocks 1.82 0.78 0.24
Firms: number of supervisory board members
With one interlock 371 328 170
With two interlocks 205 175 89
With three interlocks 136 131 90
With four interlocks 141 69 32
With ﬁve interlocks 49 77 6
With more than ﬁve interlocks 170 220 0
Total interlocks 3,440 3,606 776
Average number of interlocks 2.23 2.39 1.05twelve over the seventy-year period studied; as mentioned in our discus-
sion of the data selection procedure, ongoing concentration in the banking
system means that the proportion of total banking equity value repre-
sented by our sample remains roughly constant at over 90 percent. Not sur-
prisingly, as the banks in the 1993 sample are so much larger, they have
more board members: 15.2 on average, as opposed to 11.7 (10.4) in 1923
(1958). Meanwhile, for both banks and industrial ﬁrms, the ratio of super-
visory board members to management board members remained fairly
steady, ranging between 1.82 and 2.27.
Table 8.3 shows us whether board members have more or less additional
board seats. For managerial board members (including the chairman), our
ﬁndings indicate that members in 1923 held many more positions than in
1958 or 1993: the average number of interlocks dropped from 1.82 in 1923
down to 0.24 in 1993. For supervisory board members the average number
of interlocks decreased less dramatically: in the postwar period the average
number fell by roughly one-half. In 1923 we also ﬁnd quite a few board
members with more than ﬁve interlocks; by 1993, no board member had
more than ﬁve additional seats.
In the remainder of this section we focus on industrial-ﬁrm board mem-
bers who have aﬃliations with banks.
Table 8.4 contains the frequency distributions of bank interlocks in
ﬁrms. Banking interlocks were more widespread in the earlier periods of
our investigation: the proportion of ﬁrms with no bank interlocks was 40
percent (39 percent) in 1923 (1958), rising to 55 percent in 1993. Thus, in
1923 and 1958, the presence of bankers was more widespread than in 1993.
In 1923, twelve ﬁrms even had ten or more bankers on the board. The av-
erage number of board members with a bank aﬃliation decreases from
0.60 (0.61) in 1923 (1958) to 0.45 in 1993. However, it should be noted that
the signiﬁcant concentration in the banking industry over the 1958–93 pe-
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Table 8.4 Frequency distribution bank interlocks
% of ﬁrms with: 1923 1958 1993
No bank interlocks 40.38 39.34 55.24
One bank interlock 22.08 26.43 25.87
Two bank interlocks 12.30 13.81 9.09
Three bank interlocks 7.89 6.61 5.59
Four bank interlocks 5.05 5.11 3.50
Five bank interlocks 4.42 3.00 0.70
Six bank interlocks 1.26 0.90 0
Seven bank interlocks 0 1.20 0
Eight bank interlocks 0.63 0.60 0
Nine bank interlocks 2.21 0.90 0
Ten or more bank interlocks 3.79 2.10 0
Average number of bank interlocks 0.596 0.607 0.447riod would have led to a decline in the number of bank board members
available for positions on industrial ﬁrm boards.
The use of interlocks by banks is illustrated in table 8.5, which lists all
banks with at least ten (ﬁfteen) interlocks in 1958 or 1993 (1923). It is clear
that there has been a substantial decline in the latter period of the century
in the number of major-bank board members who sit directly on indus-
trial-ﬁrm boards.21
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Bank voor Indië 55
De Twentsche Bank 50
Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij 43
Hollandsche Bank voor Zuid-Amerika 31
Koloniale Bank 31
De Nederlandsche Bank 26
Kas-Vereeniging 26
Amsterdamsche Bank 19
Bank-Associatie Wertheim & Gompertz 1834 en Credietvereeniging 1853 18
Nederlandsch Indische Handelsbank 16
1958 (over 10)
Rotterdamsche Bank N.V. 149
De Nederlandsche Bank N.V. 73
De Twentsche Bank N.V. 63
Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij N.V. 51
Amsterdamsche Bank N.V. 46
Nationale Handelsbank N.V. 20
Bank voor Handel en Scheepvaart N.V. 20
N.V. Export-Financiering-Maatschappij 19
N.V. Nederlandsche Bankinstelling voor Waarden belast met Vruchtgebruik 
en Periodieke Uitkeringen 19
Van Mierlo en Zoon N.V. 19
Nederlandse Overzee Bank N.V. 14
N.V. Hollandsche Disconteeringsmaatschappij van 1939 12
N.V. Hollandsche Koopmansbank 12
Kas-Associatie N.V. 11
Maatschappij voor Middellang Crediet N.V. 11
Hollandsche Bank Unie N.V. 11
1993 (over 10)
Abn-Amro 34
Internationale Nederlanden Bank (ING) 18
Nationale Investeringsbank 18
MeesPierson 14
21. Our data do not allow us to determine whether all or part of this decline may be oﬀset
by the placement of bank oﬃcials from below the board level on industrial ﬁrm boards.Table 8.6further documents the decline in interlocks, contrasting banks’
and other industrial ﬁrms’ board members’ roles on industrial-ﬁrm
boards. Industrial-ﬁrm interlocks have declined steeply over the seventy
years of our investigation; the overall decline in the average number of in-
terlocks is by roughly a half. While multiple supervisory board member-
ships are still very common, interlocks involving management board mem-
bers in particular have fallen steeply. Indeed, by 1993 there was no
industrial ﬁrm in our sample sharing a common management board mem-
ber with a bank or other industrial ﬁrm.
Meanwhile, the role of banks in industrial ﬁrm board interlocks was
falling even more rapidly than that of industrial peers. Again, bank-
industry interlocks involving a management board member fell very
steeply, far more so than those involving two supervisory boards. A further
decline in bank interlocks over the period 1976–96 is documented by
Heemskerk, Mokken, and Fennema (2003), who ﬁnd that ﬁnance-industry
interlocks declined by almost 40 percent over that period, outpacing the 25
percent decline in overall interlocks.
Table 8.7 compares and contrasts the prevalence of interlocks in family
and nonfamily ﬁrms; the criterion used to deﬁne family ﬁrms in this table
is a board member with a surname that matches the ﬁrm’s original name.
In 1928, the only signiﬁcant diﬀerence was that members of the manage-
ment board of nonfamily ﬁrms were much more likely to be on the board
of other industrial ﬁrms. By 1958, this diﬀerence had largely disappeared,
as nonfamily ﬁrms’ board members became more like those of family
ﬁrms. In 1993, the situation had reversed, as the management board
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Table 8.6 Interlocks at ﬁrm level
Own ﬁrm—other ﬁrm—type of other ﬁrm 1923 1958 1993
Supervisory board—supervisory board—industrial 5.997 6.327 3.441
(83.9) (79.9) (74.1)
Supervisory board—management board—industrial 1.079 0.901 0.454
(46.7) (42.3) (37.8)
Management board—supervisory board—industrial 1.530 0.921 0.454
(31.5) (24.6) (20.3)
Management board—management board—industrial 1.000 0.366 0
(25.6) (12.3) (0)
Supervisory board—supervisory board—bank 1.202 1.285 0.622
(46.7) (53.7) (40.6)
Supervisory board—management board—bank 0.461 0.198 0.077
(29.0) (17.4) (7.7)
Management board—supervisory board—bank 0.293 0.201 0.084
(11.4) (8.4) (7.7)
Management board—management board—bank 0.287 0.012 0
(3.8) (0.9) (0)
Note: Average number of interlock and in parentheses percentage of ﬁrms with at least one
interlock.Table 8.7 Characteristics of family ﬁrms
1923 1958 1993
Family No family Family No family Family No family
Book value total assets 12,043 14,309 67,937 84,190 1,885,229 2,312,999
Past three-year growth book 
value assets –0.151 –0.048∗ 0.289 0.112∗∗∗ 0.372 0.159
Tobin’s q 0.400 0.362 0.464 0.405∗∗ 1.284 1.269
Return on assets 0.030 0.090∗∗ 0.152 0.162 0.076 0.073
Four-year standard deviation 
ROA 0.040 0.035 0.036 0.032
Payout ratio 0.331 0.392 0.511 0.795 0.257 0.376
Debt to total assets 0.306 0.298 0.398 0.316∗∗∗ 0.537 0.534
Fixed assets to total assets 0.436 0.596∗∗∗ 0.331 0.432∗∗∗ 0.417 0.379
Cash and liquid assets to total 
assets 0.093 0.122 0.080 0.140∗∗∗ 0.068 0.109
Age 13.57 25.01∗∗∗ 37.28 50.88∗∗∗ 65.80 47.67
RvB size 2.52 2.02∗∗∗ 2.91 2.09∗∗∗ 2.67 2.78
RvC size 4.52 5.01∗ 4.36 4.61 4.22 5.23
Dummy certiﬁcates 0.090 0.130 0.20 0.27 0.22 0.40
Dummy priority shares 0.045 0.018 0.450 0.220∗∗∗ 0.56 0.42
Dummy preferred shares 0.44 0.61
Dummy structured regime 0.33 0.54
Dummy interlock RvC—
RvC/industrial 0.87 0.83 0.80 0.80 0.56 0.75
Dummy interlock RvC—
RvB/industrial 0.42 0.49 0.39 0.44 0.44 0.37
Dummy interlock RvB—
RvC/industrial 0.18 0.37∗∗∗ 0.20 0.27 0.44 0.19∗∗
Dummy interlock RvB—
RvB/industrial 0.08 0.33∗∗∗ 0.09 0.14 0.00 0.00
Dummy interlock RvC—
RvC/bank 0.43 0.48 0.51 0.55 0.33 0.41
Dummy interlock RvC—
RvB/bank 0.36 0.26 0.18 0.17 0.11 0.07
Dummy interlock RvB—
RvC/bank 0.08 0.13 0.11 0.07 0.11 0.07
Dummy interlock RvB—
RvB/bank 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Ownership largest outside 
blockholder 22.27 24.64
Ownership all outside 
blockholders 34.67 43.67
Ownership banks 7.79 7.12
Ownership RvB members 20.00 4.32∗∗∗
Ownership RvC members 10.32 1.94∗∗
No. of observations 89 228 92 241 9 134
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.members of nonfamily ﬁrms became even less likely to hold supervisory
board positions elsewhere.
To complete our description of the prevalence of interlocks, table 8.8
illustrates their relation to takeover defense mechanisms. In both 1923
and 1958 interlocking directorships, especially those of the management
board, show a strong positive association with certiﬁcation of shares. By
1993 this was no longer the case. Instead, supervisory board cross-
directorships were associated with the use of defensive preferred shares,
and most types of interlocks were associated with subjection to the struc-
tured regime, which may simply indicate that these are the larger and less
multinationally oriented ﬁrms.
As an exploratory enquiry into the impact of interlocks on industrial
performance, in table 8.9 the second of each year’s set of regressions con-
siders the impact of interlocks on Tobin’s q. The impact is insigniﬁcant in
1993, but in the two earlier years the association between interlocks and q
Financing and Control in The Netherlands 499
Table 8.8 Relations between takeover defenses and interlocks and ownership
1923 1958 1993
Priority Priority  Preferred  Structured 
Certiﬁcates Certiﬁcates shares Certiﬁcates shares shares regime
Dummy certiﬁcates 1.000 1.000 –0.007 1.000 –0.188∗∗ –0.120 0.080
Dummy priority shares –0.007 1.000 –0.188∗∗ 1.000 0.009 –0.012
Dummy preferred shares –0.120 0.009 1.000 0.323∗∗
Dummy structured regime 0.080 –0.012 0.323∗∗∗ 1.000
Dummy interlock RvC—
RvC/industrial 0.079 0.099 0.065 0.106 –0.072 0.171∗∗ 0.341∗∗
Dummy interlock RvC—
RvB/industrial 0.093 0.068 –0.024 0.066 –0.001 0.074 0.240∗∗
Dummy interlock RvB—
RvC/industrial 0.218∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗ –0.018 –0.184∗∗ 0.163 0.055 0.195∗∗
Dummy interlock RvB—
RvB/industrial 0.144∗∗ 0.059 –0.052
Dummy interlock RvC—
RvC/bank 0.113∗∗ 0.186∗∗ –0.061 0.079 –0.050 0.207∗∗ 0.205∗
Dummy interlock RvC—
RvB/bank 0.071 0.065 0.011 –0.012 0.016 0.074 0.061
Dummy interlock RvB—
RvC/bank 0.087 0.351∗∗∗ 0.026 –0.066 0.069 0.074 0.166∗∗
Dummy interlock RvB—
RvB/bank 0.134∗∗ 0.019 0.081
Ownership largest outside 
blockholder –0.155 –0.155 –0.182∗∗ –0.082
Ownership all outside 
blockholders –0.084 –0.195∗∗ –0.173∗∗ –0.024
Ownership banks –0.005 –0.241∗∗∗ 0.153 0.198∗∗
Ownership RvB members –0.165∗∗ –0.006 –0.022 –0.273∗∗∗
Ownership RvC members –0.038 0.057 –0.083 –0.085
∗∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.is negative whenever it is signiﬁcant. This is weak evidence that interlocks,
and especially those that involve management board members of other in-
dustrial ﬁrms or banks, were not beneﬁcial in 1923 and 1958.
8.5 Conclusions
Our paper gives a bird’s-eye overview of ﬁnancing and control of Dutch
listed ﬁrms over the past century. Regarding the inﬂuence of families in
ﬁrms, our data suggest a clear trend toward professional management tak-
ing hold in the second half of the twentieth century. The role of banks in
the control and ﬁnancing of Dutch industry seems to have been rather sec-
ondary, and more British than German in nature. While employees have
been given some voice in corporate decision making in the last few decades
of the century, again, their power is not as strong as in Germany. Real de-
cision-making power currently seems to rest very strongly with a set of self-
perpetuating management insiders, entrenched behind a quite formidable
array of takeover defenses. But the ongoing process of convergence toward
a common European model is slowly but surely eliminating some of the
idiosyncrasies of Dutch corporate governance.
Appendix
Railway Finance in the Nineteenth Century
The ﬂotation of a number of railway issues in the middle of the nine-
teenth century seems to have been fairly easy, with the exception of the
Nederlandse Centraalspoorweg Maatschappij in 1860, which many indus-
try insiders realized in advance would be unproﬁtable because it did not
connect major industries or population centers.
These ﬂotations are of additional interest because the disposition of the
shares has been investigated, giving some insight into their initial owner-
ship structure. Van den Broeke (1983, 1985) documents in detail how ini-
tial ﬁnance was raised. As a case in point, take the 1863 ﬂotation of the
Maatschappij tot Exploitatie van Staatsspoorwegen. The initial share-
holders were 244 in number, holding a total of 24,000 shares of f 250 each
(f 6 million in total). The largest stake reported by Van den Broeke is 3,000
shares held by a Paris bank, Hottinguer & Cie; the second largest, 2,765
shares, by Wurfbain en Zoon, an Amsterdam securities brokerage house.
Four other stakes of 1,000 shares and above are mentioned, all held by
banks in Amsterdam, London, and Brussels.
There is no sign that any of these shareholders were motivated by a de-
502 Abe de Jong and Ailsa Röellsireto take a controlling stake in the venture: the largest stake was no more
than 12.5 percent. The largest stakes were all held by banking houses or se-
curities ﬁrms. Many of these were based abroad and therefore in no posi-
tion to exercise meaningful control. In total, 74.5 percent of the capital was
taken up by the banking/ﬁnancial sector, and the Dutch banks never de-
veloped an active role in the management of industry as in the German
model.
Nor is there any sign that the government saw shareholding as an at-
tractive means of ensuring control. The king and his entourage, and vari-
ous politicians, government oﬃcials and members of the judiciary con-
tributed for less than 600 shares in total. When eﬀorts to raise a further f 6
million in the subsequent ﬁve years seemed to founder, the government re-
peatedly declined to step in and only came up with a loan of f 2.5 million,
to be paid oﬀ as soon as new equity was raised.22 There seem to have been
a couple of shareholders with direct commercial ties to the railway busi-
ness: a shipping line connecting England to Vlissingen (Flushing), for ex-
ample.
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22. Even this very modest form of government support was considered too much in some
quarters, to judge by a pamphlet published in Breda in 1866, entitled May the money, that is
contributed by the Dutch citizen as taxes, be lent to a private company for its own proﬁt? A word
to the Dutch people, by Someone (Mag het Geld, dat door den Nederlandschen Burger als Be-
lasting Wordt Opgebragt, Worden Geleend aan eene Maatschappij van Partikulieren, Tot Haar
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It is natural to compare the Netherlands and Sweden since they are the two
smallest countries surveyed in this volume, but also because their ﬁnancial
systems and corporate control structures have developed along diﬀerent
historical paths from initial points that could hardly have been further
apart. The free city of Amsterdam provided the fertile ground for the ﬁrst
modern hub of international ﬁnancial markets and advanced intermedia-
tion that, for example, helped underdeveloped Sweden to ﬁnance imperial
wars against neighboring countries. The Swedish students, sailors, and
businessmen who visited Amsterdam in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries were attracted by the city’s openness and dynamics. The philoso-
pher René Descartes, who went the other way to enlighten the court of
Queen Christina, was taken by the poverty, isolation, and coldness of
Stockholm compared to the opulence and modernity of Amsterdam, even
if the initial shock was not the immediate cause of his death in the winter
of 1650 shortly after his arrival.
When the political map of Europe was signiﬁcantly redrawn during the
following centuries, the relative decline of Amsterdam and the fast indus-
trialization of peaceful but very poor Sweden after 1870 evened out the
economic diﬀerences between the two countries. Today the two countries
are small, open, and export-oriented economies dominated by very large
transnational companies. But the conspicuous institutional diﬀerences be-
tween the two countries’ ﬁnancial systems and corporate control struc-
tures reﬂect the strong, historical path dependence of their developments.
Abe de Jong and Ailsa Röell’s chapter illustrates this very nicely by paint-
ing a broad picture of the Dutch ﬁnancial developments that is suitable for
a comparative analysis with Sweden. They also present interesting analy-
ses of how characteristics (for example, leverage, payout ratios, and Tobin’s
q) of ﬁrms listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange have changed over
time and of interlocking board memberships. Given the thick veil of se-
crecy that by tradition protects Dutch ﬁrms, the authors have done an ex-
cellent job when collecting their data.
Even if God’s hand may be in the details, I will focus my comparative
analysis on three major characteristics of the Dutch ﬁnancial system and
discuss possible causal links in the historical development using Sweden as
an alternative institutional setting.
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nomics.The Limited Role of Banks in Corporate Financing
For an outside observer perhaps the most surprising feature of the
Dutch ﬁnancial system is “the limited role played by the banks in the ﬁ-
nancing of industrial growth” throughout the industrialization as well as
later. Although the banks were not prohibited from operating as universal
banks, they specialized in the traditional short-term mercantile ﬁnancing
like British banks and stayed out of long-term, industrial ﬁnancing, and
did not hold equity stakes in their clients. This started a long tradition of
bank noninterventionism in Dutch corporate governance. Instead, the in-
dustrial ﬁrms’ demand for capital was satisﬁed via the prolongatie system
of short-term callable margin loans collected from wealthy private persons
through an old, local network of agents outside the banking system.
At ﬁrst sight this seems the most unlikely source of long-term industrial
ﬁnancing, but it was evidently competitive enough to preempt the banks
from entering the market for a long time. The semi-market character of the
decentralized system seemed to have circumvented the general public’s dis-
trust of ﬁnancial institutions due to very bad experiences in the past. The
wealth accumulated in the Golden Ages and controlled by wealthy rentier
families thus ﬁnanced investments several centuries later. This is a nice
example of path dependence in the development of a ﬁnancial system, de-
spite the turmoil created by the Napoleonic Wars. The Dutch case thus
shows that development of a universal banking system is not necessary for
ﬁnancing of industrial growth when the private, pecuniary wealth of a
country is in the hands of a small but suﬃciently large number of wealthy
families that also have access to nonintermediated networks for invest-
ments.
The story becomes more intriguing when we compare it to what hap-
pened in Belgium, the industrialized and relatively poorer southern part,
after the separation from the Netherlands. Despite initially having the
same legal origin and identical banking laws as well as the same corporate
law, universal banking became the Belgian solution, and, unlike in the
Netherlands, pyramiding became extensive. Although the stronger French
inﬂuence in Belgium points in the direction of universal banking, I conjec-
ture that the lack of a larger class of very wealthy families combined with a
substantial demand for long-term industrial investments explains why col-
lection of savings from the broader base of all people in the society via a
universal banking system became the solution. A well-developed deposit
banking system may collect the necessary savings at a relatively low cost
but may not be able to intermediate eﬃciently without developing special
competencies in industrial ﬁnancing. Direct equity ownership may be one
way to make the monitoring of clients more eﬃcient, but recurrent indus-
trial crises may also explain why banks became owners of large equity po-
sitions. When dual-class shares are prohibited, pyramiding may be an at-
508 Abe de Jong and Ailsa Röelltractive solution to control ﬁrms for both banks and other interests, as the
Belgian example shows.
The development of Swedish banking from a pure deposit system to a
universal banking system when the demand for industrial ﬁnancing in-
creased substantially at the beginning of the twentieth century illustrates
this very nicely. Lacking a suﬃciently broad base of wealthy people, the na-
tional political debate was about how to collect the citizens’ savings via a
national banking system in order to ﬁnance the necessary industrial in-
vestments; the infrastructural investments were primarily ﬁnanced via in-
ternational public bonds. Down the road the banks later became the con-
trolling owners of the largest industrial ﬁrms in Sweden via pyramiding,
most often combined with the use of dual-class shares.
If the ﬁnancial system in general and the stock markets in particular are
underdeveloped due to lack of a suﬃciently large group of wealthy indi-
viduals at the early stage of industrialization, corporate ﬁnancing via uni-
versal banking may thus become the dominating interface instead of stock
market–based corporate ﬁnancing. While universal banking seems to
point in the direction of bank and shareholder control via separation of
ownership from control through use of either dual-class shares or pyra-
miding or both, the Dutch case without universal banking seems to lead to
dispersed ownership but with very entrenched managerial control via use
of other legal devices to separate ownership from control when dual-class
shares are prohibited. It thus seems to be the combinationof a wealthy class
of investors with investment options outside the banking system, and the
prohibition of dual-class shares that in the Dutch case implies managerial
control with dispersed ownership. The passive rentier attitude of Dutch eq-
uity investors has perhaps reinforced this eﬀect. By being counterfactual to
the convention in Continental Europe, the Dutch case thus in eﬀect sup-
ports the causal link between universal banking and shareholder corporate
control via separation of ownership and control.
I thus conjecture that when the initial level of wealth in a country is low
and nonintermediated forms of ﬁnancing are rare or nonexistent, interme-
diation of industrial ﬁnancing via a universal banking system is more likely
to occur, which seems to later imply shareholder control via strong separa-
tion of ownership and control. The Dutch case seems to be the exception
that supports the generality of this conjecture.
The Bulwark of Takeover Defenses
While it seems relatively straightforward to identify when the Dutch tra-
dition to use very elaborate entrenchment devices started, it is much more
diﬃcult to understand why it happened. It would have been very interest-
ing to have more information and analysis of the political background to
the corporate law of 1881, and to know why it did not permit “the use of
nonvoting or lower-voting shares, thus ruling out one obvious mean of de-
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laws have consistently used the same design principle. Since the earlier cor-
porate law of 1838 that mandated voting caps in order to protect minority
shareholders and also became the standard feature of later corporate laws,
there seems to have been a common underlying principle to limit the power
of large block shareholders. But why did this early and strong aversion
against shareholder control occur?
Was it a delayed reaction to the manifest and persistent expropriation of
noncontrolling shareholders in the Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie
(VOC)—the Dutch East India Company—or was it an attempt to protect
the Dutch ﬁrms from hostile takeovers by German and French ﬁrms, as
the authors suggest? The latter alternative is less plausible as it does not
explain why the use of dual-class shares, the single most eﬃcient anti-
takeover defense, was prohibited or what would stop the new controlling
owners from getting around the law by taking the ﬁrm private or forming
a merger. Or was it because the ordinary shareholders viewed themselves
as passive rentiers primarily interested in dividends that are shared in pro-
portion to their capital contribution, and not in corporate control? It
seems as if the Dutch investors behaved more like long-term bondholders
rather than as typical shareholders because of their large and old private
wealth.
I have no speciﬁc answer to these questions, but it seems pivotal to un-
derstandwhy if we want to understand the current Dutch control structure
since the ﬁrst corporate laws that carefully limited the larger shareholders’
opportunities to maintain and exert corporate control set the standard for
the future laws and, thus, shaped the future control structures through path
dependence. For example, were the legislators and the larger shareholders,
who probably exerted political inﬂuence, (fully) aware at the time that the
corporate law down the road opened up for co-optive managerial control
protected by a plethora of antitakeover devices, which became a Dutch
specialty long before U.S. lawyers perfected it in recent decades with the
help of the state of Delaware? If they were aware of the consequences, why
the manifest intention to limit the power not only of the controlling share-
holders but also de facto of the noncontrolling ones?
The relatively strong protection of minority shareholders against expro-
priation by controlling shareholders in the Dutch corporate laws thus im-
plies both (a) (relatively) dispersed ownership and (b) very strong manage-
rial entrenchment via direct control often without ownership. The ﬁrst
implication appears consistent with Burkart, Panunzi, and Shleifer’s
(2003) legal minority protection theory of corporate ownership, while the
second is inconsistent since the shareholders are poorly protected against
managerial expropriation as well as against ineﬃcient decisions by the
management (agency costs); hostile takeovers are hardly eﬃcient threats!
The missing nonlegalelement in the Dutch case seems to be that banks were
510 Abe de Jong and Ailsa Röellpassive and did not get involved in long-term industrial ﬁnancing and cor-
porate ownership, which opened up for managerial control instead. Hence,
strong legal protection of minority shareholders does not rule out excep-
tionally strong managerial entrenchment through co-option.
There is a fundamental diﬀerence between (a) mechanisms that prima-
rily protect the large shareholders’ interests by separating ownership from
control, like dual-class shares, pyramiding, and cross-shareholding, and
(b) other devices like the administratiekantoor, preference shares, the X
rule, voting limits, and so on that entrench management control by diluting
andlimitingthe value of shareholder control. The ﬁrst type of defenses im-
plies reinforced shareholder control via separation of ownership and con-
trol, while the latter type opens up for and supports managerial control by
weakening shareholder control. The two sets of protective mechanisms are,
however, substitutes in the following sense: if a Swedish or a U.S. IPO ﬁrm
uses dual-class shares it uses none or very few of the other mechanisms,
while ﬁrms without such shares often have a long list of complementary
antitakeover defenses, but not as extensive a list as the Dutch arsenal; see
Field and Karpoﬀ (2002) and Holmén and Högfeldt (2004). The empirical
results thus imply that because of the long-standing prohibition of dual-
class shares, the single most powerful mechanism against takeovers, the
Dutch ﬁrms use a diversiﬁed portfolio of other, weaker antitakeover de-
fenses; pyramiding is of limited use since it supports shareholder control.
As a comparison, table 8C.1 shows the extreme simplicity and trans-
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Table 8C.1 Use of control mechanisms by controlling owner (%; from Agnblad 
et al. 2001)
Dual-class Right  of  Voting Mandatory  Shareholder 
Sample (% of total) shares preemption restriction bid rule agreement
Whole sample (100) 63 13 4 1 5
Bank (1) 50 0 0 0 0
Buyout investor (1) 0 0 0 0 0
Family (62) 71 16 3 0.5 6
Foreign (8) 46 8 13 4 4
Foundation (0.3) 100 0 0 0 0
Insurance (1) 33 0 0 0 0
Mutual fund (6) 32 5 0 0 0
Other (8) 71 13 0 0 0
Public (2) 29 0 0 0 0
Sphere (10) 61 7 10 7 3
Source: Aktiemarknadsbevakning (AMB), Sundin and Sundqvist (1998), company charters,
and Patent- och Registreringsverket (PRV).
Notes: Table shows frequency of diﬀerent control mechanisms for 304 ﬁrms listed on the
Stockholm Stock Exchange and the Stockholm Börsinformation list in October 1998. The
sample is split into subsamples based on the characteristics of the controlling shareholder and
type of mechanism.parency of the control structure of Swedish ﬁrms listed on the Stockholm
Stock Exchange; see Agnblad et al. (2001). The dual-class share design is
the most commonly used mechanism to control ﬁrms, in particular for
family ﬁrms, since 63 percent of the listed ﬁrms use it. Only 13 percent of
the ﬁrms have the right to preemptively redeem nonlisted A-shares that
have been passed on to a new owner. This is the second most common con-
trol mechanism; the others are very infrequently used. The use of dual-
class shares to separate ownership from control has very strong political
support in Sweden since it is a very eﬃcient protection against foreign
takeovers; see Holmén and Högfeldt (2004).
Another important element of the Dutch control structure is the strate-
gic use of co-optive (family) foundations that by legal design are very
opaque, almost impenetrable for an outsider like the tax authorities, and
not subject to taxation on corporate dividends. This is an important ad-
vantage since dividends to regular shareholders are disadvantaged by a rel-
ativelyhigh tax, which implies a low payout ratio of proﬁts and support for
use of retained earnings as a primary source of ﬁnancing. Since share-
holders discount the levered and opaque control structure when the ﬁrms
need to raise external capital from the capital markets, the relatively high
tax on dividends seems like a logical element of the Dutch control structure
to lock in capital into the existing ﬁrms.
The strong legal support and protection of the very secretive founda-
tions is another example of the extreme nature of the Dutch control struc-
ture. The historical preference for secretive, private decision making
among a small number of business partners and for co-optive control al-
ready in place in the golden days of Amsterdam seems to have been prop-
agated through time and taken to its extreme—another interesting ex-
ample of path dependence. The strong aversion for centuries to making
annual reports and accounting information available to general share-
holders and to the public is another example.
It is thus logical that the founding families of the two most successful
ﬁrms founded in Sweden during the last ﬁfty to sixty years, IKEA (the
Kamprads) and Tetra Pak (the Rausings), have moved their fortunes out
of reach of the Swedish tax authorities and have kept their ﬁrms fully
private by using the very favorable Dutch legislation for private founda-
tions as holding entities before paying out rents to personal foundations
for the family members in Liechtenstein. The heavy entrenchment, very
comfortable secrecy (no questions asked), and low or nonexistent taxes on
corporate dividends are thus very convenient features of the Dutch foun-
dations, also for foreign families interested in locking in control for gener-
ations.
The historical irony in the case of the Netherlands is that the strong
public aversion against corporate power in the hands of large shareholders
as well as in the hands of ﬁnancial institutions like banks has generated
512 Abe de Jong and Ailsa Röellperhaps the most extreme concentration of corporate power in the hands
of very heavily entrenched and co-optive management teams and founda-
tions that operate behind a legal veil of secrecy. But where did all the share-
holders go, and why did they give up their power so easily without a ﬁght?
The answer seems to lie in the original character of the Dutch ﬁnancial sys-
tem and the strong historical path dependency in its development.
The Politics of Corporate Control
Since political ideologies and decisions shape and aﬀect the develop-
ment of a country’s corporate control system, a deeper understanding re-
quires an analysis of how politics and corporate ﬁnancing interact. The
public acceptance of a corporate governance structure in a society ulti-
mately depends on its politically viability; without manifest political sup-
port, an extreme control structure will not survive. An analysis of the pol-
itics of Dutch corporate governance would thus have been even more
interesting. The authors have, however, decided to leave this out of their al-
ready very rich chapter. But they stress that the small Dutch welfare soci-
ety, like the even smaller Swedish society, is strongly consensus oriented.
Despite this political aﬃnity, the two countries’ control structures have de-
veloped along diﬀerent paths over the past thirty to forty years.
There is, however, a common theme. The vigorous political ambitions in
both countries since the late 1960s to reform the traditional control struc-
tures and make them more “democratic” by giving ﬁrms’ stakeholders
more voice has had the opposite result: the entrenchment of the controlling
interests has increased in recent decades. But the two countries followed
very diﬀerent roads. In the Netherlands the trade unions did not unex-
pectedly join forces with the management and short shrift the sharehold-
ers by transferring pivotal decision-making powers from the shareholders’
annual meeting to a co-optive (corporative) supervisory board dominated
by management and labor appointees. The already entrenched managerial
power was thus reinforced by a political measure that was supposed to
achieve the opposite. Were there any strong political protests voiced
against the structured regime, or was it done in consensus behind a veil of
secrecy? It would have been interesting to know how this actually hap-
pened since it seems to have been a relatively recent, pivotal event.
In Sweden employees were granted formal representation in the boards
but with very limited decision-making power; the primary motivation was
to have access to pertinent corporate information and an opportunity to
give voice. The traditional skepticism toward managerial capitalism be-
cause of its perceived short-sightedness, combined with the political con-
sensus between the leading capitalism and the Social Democrats, instead
resulted in stronger political support for the incumbent owners in control.
The new corporate law as well as the political rhetoric stressed the pivotal
importance of ﬁrms having well-deﬁned and strong owners in control; in-
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jective. A more realistic and sinister objective was to ascertain that the
leading listed ﬁrms remained under Swedish control when capital markets
became deregulated and capital demands increased as the international
competition became more vigorous.
The two consensus-oriented welfare societies thus handled the new his-
torical situation very diﬀerently by (not unexpectedly) reinforcing the in-
cumbent management in the Netherlands and the controlling shareholders
in Sweden. The path dependence in the development of the two countries’
control structures was therefore reinforced rather than weakened. The
longer historical perspective that pinpoints the path dependence, however,
also accentuates rather than moderates the impression of how much has
happened in recent decades! In both countries, however, the historical
compass points in the direction of more entrenched control structures
rather than toward more ﬂexible ones.
Final Thoughts
The case of the Netherlands is very interesting by itself because Amster-
dam gave birth to the ﬁrst modern, advanced ﬁnancial system. I think,
however, that the Dutch case is even more interesting since it nicely illus-
trates how its historical roots via path dependence have shaped future de-
velopments without making the outcomes predictable: a mixture of ran-
dom and nonrandom factors representing Anglo-Saxon, German, and
French inﬂuences of a political, legal, and economic nature has aﬀected the
actual path followed by a small country at the geographical crossroads. For
example, there was managerial control of the largest listed ﬁrms like in the
United States, although with a distinctive Dutch control twist, and a bank-
ing system that focused on short-term mercantile ﬁnancing as in the
United Kingdom rather than universal banking with long-term industrial
ﬁnancing as in continental Europe. The Dutch ﬁnancial system is thus not
a clean example that easily ﬁts into the civil law country camp. The stan-
dard dichotomy is simply too coarse when we really want to understand the
development and characteristics of the Dutch ﬁnancial system; the diﬀer-
ences versus other civil law countries like Sweden are simply more inter-
esting than the similarities. It is thus not surprising that the EU, dominated
by civil law countries, has failed conspicuously to harmonize takeover
codes and eliminate antitakeover defenses despite ambitious attempts.
The comparison between the Netherlands and Sweden, however, shows
that the developments of the national control structures over time have a
common element—the strong historical path dependence since estab-
lished control structures reproduce and even reinforce themselves over
time despite changing conditions—but the Dutch case takes it to the ex-
treme. Civil law countries seem to be conducive to such dependencies and
causalities since their political organization and decision-making pro-
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lands for prohibition of dual-class shares in the corporate law as well as of
pyramiding seems down the road to (logically) imply managerial control
protected by a plethora of antitakeover defenses. There is signiﬁcant polit-
ical support in Sweden to instead allow and even encourage the use of con-
trol mechanisms that rigidly separate votes from capital, which points in
the future direction of maintained shareholder control via increased sepa-
ration of ownership from control over time but without using any other
special antitakeover devices. It is thus not surprising that large listed ﬁrms
in the Netherlands are controlled by co-optive management teams while in
Sweden the controlling owners ultimately make the pivotal decisions.
Since the Dutch case is an extreme exception to the typical continental
European corporate control structure, I am still puzzled by three enigmas:
First, why have shareholders passively accepted that their control powers
have been transferred to co-optive and heavily entrenched management
teams often without direct ownership? Second, how eﬃcient is such a rigid
and opaque corporate control structure over time, in particular when sub-
ject to structural changes in a competitive international environment? And
third, why were dual-class shares prohibited in the ﬁrst Dutch corporate
laws, and how has this aﬀected the development of the Dutch corporate
control structure?
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